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November 02 市场分割理论(Market Segmentation Theory) 市场分割理论的产生源于市场的非有效性(或非完美性)和投资者的有限理性,它的最早倡导者是卡伯特森(Culbertson,1957)。
市场分割理论认为预期理论的假设条件在现实中是不成立的,因此也不存在预期形成的收益曲线;事实上整个金融市场是被不同期限的债券所分割开来的,而且不同期限的债券之间完全不能替代。 该理论认为,由于存在法律、偏好或其他因素的限制,投资者和债券的发行者都不能无成本地实现资金在不同期限的证券之间的自由转移。因此,证券市场并不是一个统一的无差别的市场,而是分别存在着短期市场、中期市场和长期市场。不同市场上的利率分别各市场的供给和需求决定。当长期债券供给曲线与需求曲线的交点高于短期债券供给曲线与需求曲线的交点时,债券的收益率曲线向上倾斜;相反,当长期债券供给曲线与需求曲线的交点低于短期债券供给曲线与需求曲线的交点时,债券的收益率曲线向下倾斜。
市场分割理论的分割 市场分割理论认为出于一些法规、规章制度以及市场参与者目标等因素,借款人和贷款人会把他们的交易局限于一个特定的期限。这些因素归结起来主要表现在以下三方面: 1、由于政府的某些规章制度,借款人和贷款人被要求只能交易特定期限的金融产品。 2、市场参与者为了规避风险而将投资者局限于某一期限的金融产品。 3、按照西蒙的观点和行为金融理论,投资者并不追求最优解,而是追求满意解。 在以上三个因素中,政府的规章制度具有最强的约束力,受该因素制约的借款人和贷款人将不会进行期限债券之间的任何替代,这样将形成强式的市场分割。规避风险因素居于次席,出于该因素而形成的市场分割属于半强式的。第三个因素和其他因素对借款人和贷款人的约束力较差,从而形成一种弱式市场分割。 市场分割理论把金融市场分为短期、中期和长期三大市场: 1、短期市场的主要参与者是商业银行、非金融机构和货币市场基金等,它们更关注的是本金确定性(或者说安全性)而不是收入的确定性。 2、长期市场的参与者主要是那些债务期限结构比较长的机构,比如人寿保险公司、养老基金等,这些机构具有较强的风险回避态度,更注重收入的确定性。 3、虽然短期市场和长期市场的投资者的投资动机和目标各有差异,但是两个市场的参与者都同样受到法律、规章制度的制约以及降低风险的压力而集中于不同期限的市场,因此,这两个市场形成的市场分割基本上是强式的,参与者通常不会进行投资期限之间的转换。相比之下,中期市场的参与者身份就比较复杂,没有一群占主导地位的“忠实”的参与者,从而其功能是弱式的。 分割的具体原因: 1、投资者可能对某种证券具有特殊偏好或投资习惯。 2、投资者不能掌握足够知识,只能对某些证券感兴趣。 3、不同借款人也只对某些证券感兴趣,因为其资金的使用性质决定了他们只会对某些期限的证券感兴趣。 4、机构投资者的负债结构决定了他们在长期和短期证券之间的选择。 5、缺少易于在国内市场上销售的统一的债务工具 市场分割理论的现实意义 市场分割理论具有一定的现实意义,一些研究成果表明,市场分割对期限结构具有一定程度的影响。基德沃尔和科沃奇(Kidwell and Koch,1983)经过对美国市政债券和联邦政府国债的比较研究发现,市政债券市场(Municipal Bond Market)以到期日为口径存在明显的市场分割现象,换句话说,地方政府发行的短期和长期债券之间很难相互替代。 另外统计资料也显示:近年来,美国联邦储备体系可以在不完全影响长期利率的情况下调整短期利率。然而市场分割理论仍然受到了很多指责,批评主要来自于纯粹预期理论和流动性升水理论的支持者,他们认为金融市场的运行效率要远远高于市场分割理论所形成的市场效率,投资者事实上更愿意在不同期限的市场之间转移资金,而不是固守于某一细分市场停滞不前。现实中,大约80% 的期限结构变动体现着利率水平的改变,这也预示着当收益率变化时,不同期限的债券基本上趋向于同步变化,因此市场分割的作用是有限的。 Preferred Habitat TheoryWhat Does Preferred Habitat Theory Mean?
A term structure theory suggesting that different bond investors prefer one maturity length over another and are only willing to buy bonds outside of their maturity preference if a risk premium for the maturity range is available. The theory also suggests that when all else is equal investors prefer to hold short-term bonds in place of long-term bonds and that the yields on longer term bonds should be higher than shorter term bonds. Investopedia explains Preferred Habitat Theory The preferred habitat theory is an expansion on the expectations theory which suggests that long-term yields are an estimate of the future expected short-term yields. The reasoning behind the expectations theory is that bond investors only care about yield and are willing to buy bonds of any maturity, which in theory would mean a flat term structure unless expectations are for rising rates. The preferred habitat theory expands on the expectation theory by saying that bond investor’s care about both maturity and return. It suggests that short-term yields will almost always be lower than long-term yields due to an added premium needed to entice bond investors to purchase not only longer term bonds, but bonds outside of their maturity preference. 流动性升水理论Liquidity Premium Theory什么是流动性升水理论
流动性升水理论又称作流动性升水或流动性报酬理论,简称LP理论。该理论在纯预期理论的基础上,充分考虑了投资于债券的风险,认为长期债券的流动性低于短期债券,这是由于“持有长期债券确定是有风险的,而这一风险会随着债券到期日增长而增加。” 最早由希克斯(1946)提出和阐发,并经科塞尔(Kessil,1965)做了进一步补充。 该理论认为金融市场是有风险的,投资者持有长期证券将比持有短期证券更具风险,如果不向长期证券持有人进行补偿,则投资者将偏好于短期证券,这样可以降低风险和增加流动性。但从借贷的角度来看,借款人却又偏好长期借款以保证他们有一稳定的资金来源,这就导致了对不同期限证券的供给和需求形式上的不平衡——投机者或许希望抵消这种不平衡。因此,该理论断言投资者和投机者都是风险厌恶的,必须支付一份流动性升水才能使他们愿意持有长期证券。 希克斯认为随着期限的延长,投资风险也随之增加,因此流动性升水 流动性升水理论的质疑和争论有些学者对升水部分提出质疑,因为现代资产组合理论认为证券收益中含有风险升水,而流动性升水与投资者的流动性偏好有关,因此他们主张债券价格变化的风险也会影响流动性升水。恩格尔和讷格(Engle and Ng,1993)就是其中的代表。他们研究了美国1964年到1989年的数据,得出与希克斯和科塞尔不同的结论: 1、如果预期未来短期利率与当前短期利率相同,则收益曲线的形状完全取决于升水部分,这样当波动率较低时,收益曲线将变得弯曲,而当波动率较高时,收益曲线将向上倾斜。 2、如果预期短期利率下降,则收益曲线仍然会向上倾斜,前提是短期利率预期下降幅度不大,同时波动率比较高。 3、当波动率较低时,预期部分在决定收益曲线形状时将起主要作用,这样,当预期短期利率下降(上升)时,收益曲线将向下(向上)倾斜。 流动性升水理论对远期利率的预测能力得到了大多数学者的认同,但是对流动性升水的性质却始终无法形成一致的意见。争论主要表现在两个方面: 1、流动性升水是否始终大于零? 莫顿(Merton,1973)、龙(Long,1974)、布利登(Breeden,1979)和考克斯等人(Cox et al,1985)认为流动性升水是随时间而变化的,但并不是时间递增函数,从而隐含了升水可能为负的可能性。法马和布里斯(1987)通过研究发现,流动性升水与经济周期有关,当经济处于繁荣时期时,预期的流动性升水将大于零;而当经济陷入萧条时,流动性升水则更可能为负。 2、流动性升水的大小到底是多少? 一些学者认为流动性升水大约在0.54% ~1.56% 的幅度内变动;另外一些学者认为即使对于较长的期限,流动性升水也不会超过0.5%;甚至一部分学者的研究成果表明流动性升水不仅不会随着时间而增加,相反会随着期限的延长而降低。 纯粹预期理论Pure Expectation Theory纯粹预期理论概述纯粹预期理论认为“只有”预期的未来短期利率,决定收益率曲线的形状;当预期未来短期利率上升时,会有上升的收益率曲线,反之,收益率曲线呈下降态势。 纯粹预期理论是最早产生的一种期限结构理论,其最早提出者可追溯到费雪(Fisher,1896),不过他本人并没有作深人研究,该理论的主要发展是希克斯(Hicks,1946)和卢茨(Lutz,1940)作出的,此后马尔基尔(Malkiel,1966)、梅塞尔曼(Meiselman,1962)和罗尔(Roll,1970、1971)进一步发展了该理论,提出了新的见解。 纯粹预期理论的主要观点是:可观察的长期利率是预期的不可观察的短期利率的平均值。需要注意的是,这里的短期利率和长期利率并没有严格的界限,两者的划分完全出于经济主体的需要和判断,但是为了方便起见,人们大多还是以一年为界来加以区分。 纯粹预期理论在投资者预期与利率变动之间建立了一种对应关系,预期改变了,收益曲线的形状也会随之发生变化,这样预期理论就为利率预测提供了一种基本框架,有利于利率预测模型的进一步发展。一些实证研究为纯粹预期理论在利率预测方面的重要作用提供了事实支持。 法马(Fama,1984b)发现利差(Spread,长期利率和短期利率之间的差异)对未来短期利率(1个月)的变化具有一定的正面预测功能;曼昆和米龙(Mankiw and Miron,1986)研究了美国1890年至1979年的国库券利率和贷款利率,认为1890年至1914年美联储成立以前,预期理论可以很好地解释收益曲线的变动,而自1915年美联储成立以后的数据则无法支持预期理论。坎普贝尔和希勒(Campbell and ShiHer,1984)、法马和布里斯(Fama and Bliss,1987)发现中期和长期的利差能在一定程度上预测未来短期利率的变化,但是他们同时也拒绝了纯粹预期理论的假设条件。希勒(1981)更是给出了具有说服力的事实来证明预期理论,他发现利差不仅对5年期债券的超额回报率具有很强的预测功能,而且他的分析数据本身也无法拒绝预期理论。哈杜威利斯(Hardouvelis,1988)利用20世纪70—80年代的国库券利率数据,发现远期利率具有关于未来即期利率走势的更多信息,远期利率因此具有很强的预测能力,即使在1979年10月到1982年10月美联储改变货币政策中介目标期间,远期利率的预测能力不但没有减弱,而且还得到了进一步的增强。这种现象表明在利率的预测能力和中央银行钉住利率目标的程度之间没有必然联系。 根据纯粹预期理论,预期是决定未来利率水平的唯一因素,只要能获得未来利率预期的足够信息和证据,就可以判断收益曲线的形状。为此,很多经济学家着手研究各种类型的形成机制,以期为纯粹预期理论寻找现实的支持,这些研究成果包括梅塞尔曼的错误学习机制、莫迪利安尼和萨奇(Modi—gliaIli and Sutch,1966)的过去利率分布滞后、莫迪利安尼和希勒(1973)、法马(1976)的通货膨胀分布滞后以及凯恩、马尔基尔(K/lne and Malkiel,1967)和弗里德曼(Friedman,1979)的专家预期模型等,他们的共同结论是:预期是期限结构决定中的一个重要因素,但其他因素显然也发挥着重要作用。他们主张放弃预期理论的纯粹形式,而用预期和流动性升水来共同解释收益曲线向上倾斜的普遍形式。 然而纯粹预期理论也受到了很多批评,因为它无法对金融市场上“收益曲线通常向上倾斜”的事实作出解释。最早提出质疑的是麦考利,他于1938年指出“预期理论的结论几乎与现实经验相反”。此外,坎普贝尔和希勒(1984)、法马(1984a、b)、法马和布里斯(1987)、琼斯和罗利(Jones and Roley,1983)、曼昆和萨莫斯(Summers,1984)、希勒以及坎普贝尔和斯科恩霍兹(Schoenholtz,1983)等人考察了美国战后以来的收益率数据,结果证明1年期以下的美国国库券收益率并不遵循纯粹预期理论,真实数据与理性预期假设具有很大冲突,因此主张拒绝纯粹预期理论。
纯粹预期理论纯预期理论基于下述假设: 1、投资者希望持有债券期间收益最大。 2、投资者对特定期限无特殊偏好,他们认为各种期限都是可以完全替代的。 3、买卖债券没有交易成本,一旦投资者察觉到收益率差异即可变换期限。 4、绝大多数投资者都可以对未来利率形成预期,并根据这些预期指导投资行为。 学者们认为,纯预期理论作为一种精巧的理论,可以较好地解释用收益率曲线表示的利率期限结构在不同时期变动的原因,但它最大的缺陷是“忽视了投资于债券或类似于票据上的内在风险”。为了克服这个缺点,人们又提出了流动性升水理论加以解释。 October 25 List of integrals of exponential functionsThe following is a list of integrals (antiderivative functions) of exponential functions. For a complete list of Integral functions, please see the list of integrals.
Definite integrals
October 22 关于Assignment, 我的一些想法October 19 第三种方法推导 Black-Scholes PDE偏微分方程 自筹经费复制法 (Self-financing replication)(自筹经费复制法LOL不知道这么翻译是否合适) 购入Pi数量的无风险债券 B, 购入Delta 数量的价格为S的资产. 得,投资组合V:
假设,标的物的资产S遵循几何布朗运动
因为债券 B为无风险债券,所以 其中r为无风险利率. 由
得:
由Self-financing 假设,得: 表示, 如果我们想购买更多的资产S(花费 反之, 如果我们想购买更多的无风险债券(花费 所以,我们可以得到, 又因为,
所以
即,
由初始假设
得, 结合 所以,
所以,
去dt 代入
移项展开,得Black-Scholes PDE偏微分方程: 第二种方法:由Ito’s Lemma + Delta Hedging推导Black-Scholes PDE偏微分方程已知, 几何布朗运动版Ito’s Lemma (另一Blog将讲解如何推导该方程) 其中,方程V(S,t)对于t存在一阶偏导, 对于S存在二阶偏导. 现建立Delta Hedging 投资组合 注意: 由几何布朗运动版Ito’s Lemma得知: 所以 则 以上方程 变为: 由无套利假设可知, 该方程表示 投资组合 所以, 因为 所以 因为 所以 去 dt 移项展开,得Black-Scholes PDE偏微分方程: June 06 How to prove indifference curve is convex function (under the conditions of U’(w)>0 and U’’(w)<0)?April 27 当代金融学6大支柱.1.市场有效性假设 (Efficient Market Hypothesis) by 尤金·法玛 (Fama,Eugene)
2.资本资产定价模型 (Capital Asset Pricing Model) by 威廉·夏普 (William Sharpe)
3.资本结构理论 (Capital Structure Theory) by 弗兰科·莫迪格利安尼(Franco Modigliani)& 默顿·米勒(Merton Miller)
4.BS期权定价模型 (Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model) by 费雪·布莱克 (Fischer Black) & 梅隆·斯科尔斯 (Myron Scholes)
5.代理理论 (Agent Theory) by 麦克·简森 (Michael Jensen) & 威廉·梅克林 (William Meckling)
6.行为金融学 (Behavioral Finance) by 罗伯特·希勒(Robert J. Shiller) April 20 Gilded AgeFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaJump to: navigation, search
For the novel, see The Gilded Age: A Tale of Today.
In American history, the Gilded Age refers to substantial growth in population in the United States and extravagant displays of wealth and excess of America's upper-class during the post-Civil War and post-Reconstruction era, in the late 19th century (1865-1901). The wealth polarization derived primarily from industrial and population expansion. The businessmen of the Second Industrial Revolution created industrial towns and cities in the Northeast with new factories, and contributed to the creation of an ethnically diverse industrial working class which produced the wealth owned by rising super-rich industrialists and financiers such as Cornelius Vanderbilt, John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, Henry Flagler, and J.P. Morgan. Their critics called them "robber barons", referring to their use of overpowering and sometimes unethical financial manipulations. There was a small, growing labor union movement, led in part by Samuel Gompers, who created the American Federation of Labor (AFL), founded in 1886. It featured very close contests between the Republicans and Democrats, with occasional third parties. Nearly all the eligible men were political partisans and voter turnout often exceeded 90% in some states. This period also witnessed the creation of a modern industrial economy. A national transportation and communication network was created, the corporation became the dominant form of business organization, and a managerial revolution transformed business operations. By the beginning of the twentieth century, per capita income and industrial production in the United States exceeded that of any other country except Britain. Long hours and hazardous working conditions led many workers to attempt to form labor unions despite strong opposition from industrialists and the courts. The wealth of the period is highlighted by the American upper class's opulent self-indulgence, but also the rise of the American philanthropy (Andrew Carnegie called it the "Gospel of Wealth") that endowed thousands of colleges, hospitals, museums, academies, schools, opera houses, public libraries, symphony orchestras, and charities. The Beaux-Arts architectural idiom of the era clothed public buildings in Neo-Renaissance architecture. This period overlaps with the nadir of American race relations, during which African Americans lost many of the civil rights obtained during the Reconstruction period. Increased racist violence, as well as exile of African Americans from the Southern states to the Midwest, started as soon as 1879. The end of the Gilded Age coincided with the Panic of 1893, a deep depression. The depression lasted until 1897 and marked a major political realignment in the election of 1896. After that came the Progressive Era. The term "Gilded Age" was coined by Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner in their 1873 book, The Gilded Age: A Tale of Today.
[edit] Industrial and technological advancesMain article: Second Industrial Revolution
The Gilded Age was rooted in industrialization, especially heavy industry like factories, railroads and coal mining. During the Gilded Age, American manufacturing production surpassed the combined total of Great Britain, Germany, and France. Railroad mileage tripled between 1860 and 1880, and tripled again by 1920, opening new areas to commercial farming, creating a truly national marketplace and inspiring a boom in coal mining and steel production. The voracious appetite for capital of the great trunk railroads facilitated the consolidation of the nation's financial market in Wall Street. By 1900, the process of economic concentration had extended into most branches of industry—a few large corporations, called "trusts", dominated in steel, oil, sugar, meatpacking, and the manufacture of agriculture machinery. Other major components of this infrastructure were the new methods for fabricating steel: the Bessemer and the Siemens steel making processes. The first billion-dollar corporation was United States Steel, formed by financier J. P. Morgan in 1901, who purchased and consolidated steel firms built by Andrew Carnegie and others. Increased mechanization of industry is a major mark of the Gilded Age's search for cheaper ways to create more product. Frederick Winslow Taylor observed that worker efficiency in steel could be improved through the use of machines to make fewer motions in less time. His redesign increased the speed of factory machines and the productivity of factories while undercutting the need for skilled labor. This mechanization made some factories an assemblage of unskilled laborers performing simple and repetitive tasks under the direction of skilled foremen and engineers. Machine shops grew rapidly, and they comprised highly skilled workers and engineers. Both the number of unskilled and skilled workers increased, as their wage rates grew. Engineering colleges were established to feed the enormous demand for expertise. Railroads invented complex bureaucratic systems, using middle managers, and set up explicit career tracks. They hired young men at age 18-21 and promoted them internally until a man reached the status of locomotive engineer, conductor or station agent at age 40 or so. Career tracks were invented for skilled blue collar jobs and for white collar managers, starting in railroads and expanding into finance, manufacturing and trade. Together with rapid growth of small business, a new middle class was rapidly growing, especially in northern cities. The United States became a world leader in applied technology. From 1860 to 1890, 500,000 patents were issued for new inventions—over ten times the number issued in the previous seventy years. George Westinghouse invented air brakes for trains (making them both safer and faster). Theodore Vail established the American Telephone & Telegraph Company. Thomas A. Edison invented a remarkable number of electrical devices, as well as the integrated power plant capable of lighting multiple buildings simultaneously; he founded General Electric corporation. Oil became an important resource, beginning with the Pennsylvania oil fields. Kerosene replaced whale oil and candles for lighting. John D. Rockefeller created Standard Oil Company to consolidate the industry. [edit] Influential figures
Gilded age philanthropy: a table d'hôte dinner menu from March 4, 1893 for a meal in honor of symphony conductor Walter Johannes Damrosch. Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, and "Commodore" Cornelius Vanderbilt were amongst the most influential industrialists during the Gilded Age. Carnegie was born into a poor Scottish family; at age 18 he became an assistant to railroad superintendent Thomas A. Scott in Pittsburgh. In 1870, Carnegie erected his first blast furnace. Both Carnegie and Rockefeller gave away most of their wealth in large scale philanthropy. Carnegie created the Carnegie Institute of Technology (now part of Carnegie Mellon University) to upgrade craftsmen into trained engineers and scientists. Carnegie built hundreds of public libraries and several major research centers and foundations. Rockefeller retired from the oil business in 1897 and devoted the next 40 years of his life to giving away most of his money using systematic philanthropy, especially in the areas of education, medicine and race relations. "Commodore" C. Vanderbilt started out as a poor Staten Island farmer boy, then quickly through his sharp wit and lethal business policies built an enormous fortune in steamships and railroading to become the wealthiest man in the world in his day. His descendants and heirs would become famous for their ability to both increase and spend their wealth, building gigantic and lavish mansions and dominating Gilded Age high society. [edit] Labor unions[edit] The rise of unionsAs American men, women, and children toiled away in the factories of the 1880s, many of them dreamed of one day living the Horatio Alger myth of moving from "rags to riches." While some Americans enjoyed unparalleled success as compared to their counterparts, many Americans still struggled to make ends meet. Workers began to organize labor unions to take responsibility for their own improvement. Modern labor unions emerged during the Civil War era. One of the earlier attempts at a national union was the National Labor Union, formed in Baltimore in 1866. The Knights of Labor, founded in 1869, had success in the late 1880s but then collapsed. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), a coalition of trades unions, became dominant in the 1890s, under Samuel Gompers. and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) emerged, encouraging all workers to unite. [edit] The great strikesWhile labor unions became increasingly popular in the late 1800s, their successes were also tempered by some crushing defeats. One of the earliest strikes following the Civil War was the Great Railroad Strike of 1877. It lasted for 45 days; it was finally ended when President Rutherford B. Hayes sent in federal troops. The number of deaths and the amount of damage caused by the strike scared many Americans. In 1886, the Knights of Labor were hit by two devastating events that eventually brought about an end to their union. The Great Southwest Railroad Strike of 1886 and the Haymarket Square Riot ended both internal and external support for the Knights. The Homestead Strike led by workers at the Homestead Steel Plant owned by Andrew Carnegie and Henry Clay Frick was an organized attempt at trying to secure better wages and working conditions than was ended with an assassination attempt on Frick. The final major strike of the late 1800s was the Pullman Strike which began at the company town of Pullman, Illinois. Owned by George Pullman, the town was the home to all the workers at the Pullman Palace Car Company. When Pullman refused to meet with workers to discuss intolerable conditions brought on by the Panic of 1893, a national rail strike was orchestrated by the American Railway Union led by Eugene V. Debs. This time the strike was halted by a court injunction and Debs was arrested by federal troops sent in by President Grover Cleveland. The Supreme Court upheld government action with their decision in the 1895 case In re Debs. With the Court decision coupled with the use of the Sherman Antitrust Act, labor unions were unable to regain much power until the 1930s. [edit] Politics
A Group of Vultures Waiting for the Storm to "Blow Over"--"Let Us Prey." Cartoon of New York's Boss Tweed and other Tammany Hall figures, drawn in 1871 by Thomas Nast and published in Harper's Weekly. Americans' sense of civic virtue was shocked by the scandals associated with the Reconstruction era: corrupt state governments, massive fraud in cities controlled by political machines, political payoffs to secure government contracts (especially the Crédit Mobilier of America scandal regarding the financing of the transcontinental railroad), and widespread evidence of government corruption during the Ulysses S. Grant Administration. This corruption divided the Republican party into two different factions, The Stalwarts led by Roscoe Conkling and the Half-Breeds led by James G. Blaine. Accordingly there were widespread calls for reform, such as Civil Service Reform led by the Bourbon Democrats and followed by the Republican Mugwumps, especially Samuel J. Tilden and Grover Cleveland. There was a sense that government intervention in the economy inevitably led to favoritism, bribery, kickbacks, inefficiency, waste, and corruption. The Bourbon Democrats led the call for a free market, low tariffs, low taxes, less spending and, in general, a Laissez-Faire (hands-off) government. They specifically denounced imperialism and overseas expansion. Many business and professional people supported this approach, although—to encourage rapid growth of industry and protect America's high wages against the low wage system in Europe—most Republicans advocated a high protective tariff. Labor activists and agrarians expressed the same spirit but focused their attacks on monopolies and railroads as unfair to the little man. Many Republicans also complained that high tariffs, for instance on British steel, benefited industrialists like Carnegie more than his employees who even at the time were regarded by many as being pitifully exploited. In politics, the two parties engaged in very elaborate get-out-the vote campaigns that succeeded in pushing turnout to 80%, 90%, and even higher. It was financed by the "spoils system" whereby the winning party distributed most local, state and national government jobs, and many government contracts, to its loyal supporters. Large cities were dominated by political machines, in which constituents supported a candidate in exchange for anticipated patronage—favors back from the government, once that candidate was elected—and candidates were selected based on their willingness to play along. The best known example of a political machine from this time period is Tammany Hall in New York City, led by Boss Tweed. Presidential elections between the two major parties (the Republicans and Democrats), were closely contested, and Congress was marked by political stalemate. Mudslinging became an increasingly popular way of gaining advantage at the polls, and Republicans employed an election tactic known as "waving the bloody shirt". Candidates, especially when combating corruption charges, would remind voters that the Republican Party had saved the nation in the Civil War. During the 1870s, voters were repeatedly reminded that the Democrats had been responsible for the bloody upheaval, an appeal that attracted many Union veterans to the Republican camp. The Republicans consistently carried the North in presidential elections. The South, on the other hand, became the Solid South, nearly always voting Democratic. The political humiliations of Reconstruction were still fresh in many minds. Conversely, the Democrats invoked images of the "lost cause" and the glorious "stars and bars" in much the same way Republicans "waved the bloody shirt." The corruption of the Republican organization led to the defection of a group of reformers called the Mugwumps that supported Democrat Grover Cleveland in 1884. This victory gave Democrats control of the presidency for the first time since the Civil War (not counting the ascension of Andrew Johnson who was technically elected as part of the Union Party). Overall, Republican and Democratic political platforms remained remarkably constant during the years before 1900. The negativity and ambiguity of politics began a shift in the press to yellow journalism, in which sensationalism and sentimental stories took as prominent a role as factual news. [edit] ImmigrationMain article: History of immigration to the United States
Prior to the Gilded Age, the time commonly referred to as the old immigration saw the first real boom of new arrivals to the United States. During the Gilded Age, approximately 10 million immigrants came to the United States in what is known as the new immigration, many in search of religious freedom and greater prosperity. The population surge in major U.S. cities as a result of immigration gave cities an even stronger impact on government, attracting power-hungry politicians and entrepreneurs. Pressuring voters or falsifying ballots was commonplace for politicians, who often sought power only to exploit their constituents. To accommodate the influx of people into the U.S., the federal government built Ellis Island in 1892 near the Statue of Liberty. After 1892, a short physical examination was given; those with contagious diseases were not admitted. Few immigrants went to the poverty-stricken South. [edit] Chinese immigrantsThe construction of the Central Pacific railroad in California and Nevada was handled largely by Chinese laborers. In the 1870 census there were 58 Chinese men and 4 women in the entire country; these numbers grew to 100,000 men and 40,000 women in the 1880 census.[1] Labor unions such as the American Federation of Labor strongly opposed the presence of Chinese labor, by reason of both economic competition and race. Immigrants from China were not allowed to become citizens until 1950; however, their children born in the U.S. were full citizens. Congress banned further Chinese immigration through the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882; the act prohibited Chinese laborers from entering the United States, but some students and businessmen were allowed in. Subsequent to the act, the Chinese population declined to only 37,000 in 1940. Although many returned to China (a greater proportion than most other immigrant groups), most of them stayed in the United States. Chinese people were unwelcome in many areas, so they resettled in the "Chinatown" districts of large cities. [edit] Urban lifeSociety itself underwent significant changes in the period following the Civil War. One of the most significant changes came in the further urbanization of the northern cities. As a result of increasing demand for factory workers as well as mass immigration from Europe, the population of cities began to swell. Major American cities such as New York and Chicago even saw populations grow in excess of one million people. These rapid changes in cities brought about modern architectural and transportation features. Louis Sullivan became a noted architect using steel frames to construct skyscrapers for the first time while pioneering the idea of "form follows function". One of his earliest works was the Wainwright Building in St. Louis, Missouri. Elisha Otis’ introduction of safety measures on elevators also helped building reach newer heights. American cities also expanded underground. In order to reduce congestion on the streets, major cities such as New York began to construct underground railroads, the forerunners to modern subways. As immigration increased in cities, poverty rose as well. New immigrants were forced to live in the poorest urban areas including the Five Points and Hell’s Kitchen in Manhattan. These areas were quickly overridden with crime gangs such as the Five Points Gang and the Bowery Boys rose to prominence. Families were forced into miserable living conditions in the so-called “dumbbell tenements” where multiple families would share rooms designed for single occupants. It was not until Danish photographer Jacob Riis published his photographic essay How the Other Half Lives that real attention was called to the unsafe and unsanitary conditions of tenement living. [edit] Social changesDuring the Gilded Age, many new social movements took hold in the United States. Many women abolitionists who were disappointed that the Fifteenth Amendment did not extend voting rights to them remained active in politics, this time focusing on issues important to them. Reviving the temperance movement from the Second Great Awakening, many women joined the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) in an attempt to bring morality back to America. Other women took up the issue of women’s suffrage which had laid dormant since the Seneca Falls Convention With leaders like Susan B. Anthony the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) was formed in order to secure the right of women to vote. Science also played an important part in social though as the work of Charles Darwin became popular. Following in Darwin’ s idea of natural selection, English philosopher Herbert Spencer proposed the idea of social Darwinism. This new concept justified the stratification of the wealthy and poor and coined the term “survival of the fittest.” Joining Spencer was Yale University professor William Graham Sumner whose book What Social Classes Owe to Each Other argued that assistance to the poor actually weakens their ability to survive in society. Sumner argued for a laissez faire and free market economy. Not everyone agreed with the social Darwinists and soon a whole movement to help the poor arose. Henry George proposed a “single tax” in his book Progress and Poverty. The tax would be leveled on the rich and poor alike, with the excess money collected used to equalize wealth and level out society. cIn Chicago, noted attorney Clarence Darrow made vocal arguments that poverty and not biology created crime. Wisconsin-born author Thorstein Veblen argued in his book The Theory of the Leisure Class that the “conspicuous consumption and conspicuous leisure" of the wealth had become the basis of social status in America. In Looking Backward author Edward Bellamy writes of a future America set in the year 2000 in which a socialist paradise has been established. The works of authors such as George and Bellamy became popular and soon clubs were created across America to discuss their ideas although these organizations rarely made any real social change. The Third Great Awakening which began before the Civil War returned and made a significant change in religious attitudes toward social progress. Followers of the new Awakening promoted the idea of the Social Gospel which gave rise to organizations such as the YMCA; Salvation Army, and settlement houses such as Hull House founded by Jane Addams in Chicago. 集体行动之困境—— 搭便车理论述评一、搭便车理论的核心观点以及方法论基础 本书作者奥尔森创造性的在集体行动的研究领域,引入了传统经济学经常强调的个体主义方法论的视角。 传统的社会理论家研究集团行为时总是认为,组织或集团的存在是为了维护其成员的共同利益,而且它们也能有效的做到这一点。而奥尔森从经济学的个人主义视角出发,首先假定,每个人都是理性人,而理性人的显著特征就是行为前要进行成本收益的计算和权衡,以追求自身效用的最大化为目的,即使在组织或集团中也是如此,由此得出了相反的结论:理性的自利的个人不会积极主动地发动集体行动、提供集体物品以满足所属集团或组织 的需要,必须对集团成员实施选择性激励才能提高成员提供集体物品的可能性。具体来说,不同规模和性质的集团对其成员行为有不同影响。在集体物品的获取方面,小集团比大集团更有优势。集团越大,它提供的集体物品的数量就会越低于最优数量。而在抱有共同利益的小集团中,存在着少数“剥削”多数的令人惊讶的倾向。可以说,个体主义方法论和理性人假设是本书所提出的搭便车理论模型的方法论基础。 二、基本概念 1,理性人:理性人是指这样的人,他们在现有的约束条件下,根据某个实践理性或者效用最大化的标准,鉴于自己的信念和愿望,来选择可用的最佳行动方案。经济人是理性人的典型代表。但奥尔森认为,理性人并不简单等同于经济人,理性人并不一定像经济人那样是完全自利的。(奥尔森,2003:73) 2,集体物品或公共物品(public goods): 在本书中,集体物品是指由集团提供的服务于整个集团中所有成员的物品(产品、服务或收益),它具有高度的非竞争性、非排他性特点,也即有些成员不用付出任何成本就可免费获得该物品。 3,大集团与小集团:奥尔森把集团粗略的分为大集团和小集团两种。大集团,可被粗略定义为由理性人组成的规模比较大的集团。小集团,可被定义为理性人组成的规模比较小的集团。 4,排外集团与相容集团:根据集团寻求的目标的性质的不同,可以把集团分为排外集团和相容集团。前者追求排他性的利益,主要指涉市场中的竞争性企业集团,它所追求的集体物品(更高的价格)带来的收益在供给上是固定的,某个集团的收益会造成其他集团收益的潜在损失;后者追求相容性的利益,主要指涉非市场集团,它所追求的集体物品带来的收益在供给上是不固定的,某个集团的壮大并不会减少其他集团的收益,反而可能使其他集团受益。两种性质的集团中的个体之间的关系十分不同,排外集团中的成员具有公认的相互依赖和寡头卖方的相互作用的特点,而在相容集团中,讨价还价或策略性的相互作用则没有那么普遍和重要。 5,市场集团与非市场集团:在本书中,前者与排外集团等同,后者与相容集团等同。 6,纯粹垄断集团、寡头垄断集团以及原子式集团:奥尔森把市场集团或排外集团分为以下三类——在产业中独占整个市场的垄断性企业被称为纯粹垄断集团,占据市场绝大多数份额的少量企业或企业集团被称为寡头垄断集团,在市场自由竞争中彼此势均力敌,因此无一家企业对其他企业有显著影响的情况下彼此相对独立的众多企业被称为原子式集团。 7,特权集团、中介集团、潜在集团:“特权”集团和“中间”集团是与市场集团的寡头卖方垄断所对应的非市场集团类型:特权集团中的每个成员或至少其中的某个人受到激励提供集体物品,即使他得承担全部成本。在“中间集团”中,没有一个成员获得的收益份额使他有动力单独提供集体物品,但其成员数量并没有大到成员间彼此注意不到其他人是否在帮助提供集体物品。而潜在集团是原子式集团在非市场条件下的对应物,由于某个成员的行为不会对其他人产生明显的影响,因此其中的成员不会受到任何激励来为获取集体物品而行动。三者同时也是按照集团规模来划分的,由特权集团到潜在集团(大集团),集团规模依次增大。 8,压力集团或游说组织:本人比较倾向于沃塞曼的定义,即一部分人组织起来为追求共同利益而对政治过程施加压力的集团。(加里•沃塞曼,1994:182) 三、本书的论证结构梗概 1、先破后立——理论模型的建立(第一章、第二章): 本书一开始就批判了传统的集团利益观,认为虽然如传统集团理论所说,每个集团都是为其成员的共同利益服务的,然而由于每个集团中的成员一般来说都是自利的理性人,而非为集体利益而无私献身的“傻瓜”,因此他们会计算自己所付出的成本和收益之间的比例关系,使得集体物品的供给(其供给是集体利益实现的重要方面)并非传统集团理论想象的那样是一帆风顺的,而是充满了挫折和不确定性。 然后作者又批判了传统的社团理论(以随意变体理论和正式变体理论为代表)。随意变体理论认为私人组织和集团是无处不在的,这一普遍性是由人类有着组织和参加社团这一根本习性决定的。正式变体理论试图把今天社团和集团的存在解释成现代工业会社会从以前的“原始”社会进化而来的一个方面。现代社会中的大型社团在某种意义上正是原始社会中小集团的等价物,两者有着同样的起源。这些起源可能是组织和参加社团的本能或嗜好,也可能是功能。尽管存在一些差异,但它们都假设,小集团和大集团只是等级不同,而性质(凝聚力、有效性、对潜在成员的吸引力等)却相同,都出于同样的理由吸引其成员。 作者指出,其实两者是按照不同的原则运作的。作者认真研究了不同大小的集团中的个人可以采取的行为的成本和收益,首先研究了小集团的优势,然后把集团分为相容集团和排外集团两大重要类别,指出两种集团中同样存在着截然不同的关系机制,最后得出结论:只有在相容集团中,才存在着提供集体物品的可能性。 相容性大集团中普遍存在较严重的搭便车现象,因而不能很好的为自己提供集体物品,而与相容性大集团相比,相容性小集团在提供公共物品上有极大的优势。 具体来说,有三个独立的但是累积的因素使较大的集团不能增进他们自身的利益。第一,集团越大,增进集团利益的人获得的集团总收益的份额就越小,有利于集团的行动得到的报酬就越少,这样即使集团能够获得一定量的集体物品,其数量也是远远低于最优水平的。第二,由于集团越大,任一个体,或集团中成员的任何(绝对)小子集能获得的总收益的份额就越小,就越不可能出现可以帮助获得集体物品的寡头卖方垄断的相互作用。第三,集团成员的数量越大,组织成本就越高。由于这些原因,集团越大,它就越不可能提供最优水平的集体物品,而且很大的集团在没有强制或独立的外界刺激的条件下,一般不会为自己提供哪怕是最小数量的集体物品。(奥尔森,2003:39-40) 而某些小集团不用靠任何强制或任何集体物品之外的正面的诱因就会给自己提供集体物品。因为,他从集体物品获得的个人收益超过了提供一定量集体物品的总成本;有些成员即使必须承担所有成本,得到的好处还是比不提供集体物品时来的多。作者进一步指出,在存在着相当程度的不平等的小集团中,即在成员的“规模”(指成员从一定水平的集体物品供给中的获益程度)不等或对集体物品的兴趣不等的集团中,集体物品最有可能被提供。(奥尔森,2003:28) 那么,该怎样解决搭便车困境呢?作者指出,只有一种独立的和“选择性”的激励会驱使潜在集团中的理性个体采取有利于集团的行动。这种选择性的激励必须是针对个体的,使得集体中做出贡献和没有作出贡献的人,作出贡献多和做出贡献少的人得到区分对待,“赏罚分明”。因此,这种激励包括正面的奖励和负面的惩罚两大部分。赵鼎新认为,这种机制可被概括为“不平等原理”,即组织内部在权力、利益、贡献和分配上都不能搞平均主义。(赵鼎新,2006:159) 此外,作者还论述了在“联邦”集团中,社会激励可以在潜在集团中导致集团导向的行动。联邦集团的特点是,一个大集团被分成几个小集团,这样在每个附属的小集团中社会激励都会鼓励成员为实现整个联邦的集体目标做出贡献。这一解决方案被赵鼎新概括为“组织结构原理”。(赵鼎新,2006:159) 2、与其他理论的对话以及对搭便车理论的实证分析(第三章至第六章) 虽然本书共有六章,但是核心章节只有两章,即前两章,对后来的研究者影响最大的也是这两章。本书后边的章节在一定程度上都是对前边章节所提出理论的说明、印证及补充。第三章以封闭的工会作为典型案例,通过对美国工会历史的详细考察,批驳了塞利格•帕尔曼的“职业控制论”,强调了强制性对于维持工会稳定性的重要作用,从而从反面印证了搭便车行为的普遍存在。第四章和第五章,作者分别列举和批判了国家和压力集团的正统理论,与它们进行理论的对话。指出了经济学家维克赛尔的“一致同意”纳税理论和里切尔的“人的二重性”理论的局限性,马克思的国家和阶级理论之所以失败的根源所在,以及在自由主义和多元主义哲学观指导下各种压力集团理论的软肋:只强调集团利益,忽视了个人利益对于集体行动的重要性。第六章属于理论联系实际的分析典范,在本章里,作者对各种主要的经济压力集团的集体行动做了搭便车理论的分析,顺便提出了副产品理论和特殊利益理论,并指出搭便车理论的弱点在于,它不能很好的解释非经济游说团体的行为。 四、本书的其他重要结论 1,工会的产生不能用工人对就业机会稀缺感到悲观来解释(塞利格。帕尔曼的“职业控制论”,“机会共产主义”,对稀缺的工作机会进行分配),限期加入工会或其他形式的强制对工会的力量和稳定是极其重要的。因此,塞利格•帕尔曼的“职业控制论”和“机会共产主义”(即认为工会成立的主要目的是为了对相对稀缺的工作机会在工会成员中进行分配)的观点是错误的。(奥尔森,2003:97-98) 2,没有出现马克思预言的那种阶级斗争,部分原因正是出于理性的功利主义行为。因为如果组成阶级的个体采取理性的行为,就不会产生争取阶级利益的行为。马克思的阶级行动表现出大型潜在集团在争取实现集体目标时所具有的特点。(奥尔森,2003:128-129) 3,大型压力集团的副产品理论:大经济集团的游说疏通团体是那些有能力以“选择性的激励”来“动员”潜在集团的组织的副产品。具有选择性激励的组织是:1,具有行使强制性措施的权威和能力;2,具有能向潜在集团中的个人提供积极诱导能力源泉的那些组织。此理论只适用于大集团或潜在集团,而不必适用于特权或中介集团。(奥尔森,2003:166) 4,特殊利益理论:商界权力的高度化证明,小集团有组织、积极的利益是能胜过大集团无组织、无保护的利益的。(奥尔森,2003:173-175) 五、对本书搭便车理论的探讨、批评和延伸 1,对小集团提供集体物品或采取集体行动优势的质疑 主要可以有两点质疑。第一个质疑来自“囚徒困境”。囚徒困境表明,即使是只有两个人组成的小集团也有可能不采取合作行为,不能提供集体物品。奥尔森在《权力与繁荣》一书中对此做了回应。他指出,问题的关键在于,两个囚徒被警察(额外的特殊环境)隔离开了,因此两个囚徒不能相互沟通。奥尔森进一步指出,小集团可以进行集体行动的逻辑适用于任何相关方能够进行互相沟通并能够达成强制执行协议的情况。(奥尔森,2005:60-61)第二个质疑来自古老的中国谚语“三个和尚没水吃”,以上谚语表明日常生活中普遍存在小集团无法进行集体行动的情况 。其实,奥尔森对此也有回答,并写在后边的注释里边,可能一般不容易被读者注意到。奥尔森指出,小集团中可能存在不成功的讨价还价,从而导致小集团也无法提供集体物品。然而,从长期来看,小集团中的所有成员不大可能永远都犯这样的错误。也许三个和尚暂时没有水喝,可是经过长期的沟通互动、讨价还价之后,三个和尚之间一般来说应该会达成一致的行为协议。(奥尔森,2003:62) 2,对搭便车的定义和分类 本书虽然创立了搭便车理论,虽然书中主要讲的就是大集团中的搭便车现象,但本书中没有一处明确提及“搭便车”的字眼。.因此可以推知,搭便车这个概念是本书发表之后,一些评论者提出来的。因此,读完本书之后,有必要对搭便车的做一个比较明确的定义,个人比较认同斯密德的定义:“高排他成本物品的非贡献使用者被称为搭便车者。”(艾伦•斯密德,2006:67) 斯密德不仅明确提出了搭便车的简明定义,还对搭便车者进行了区分,将其区分为冒险的搭便车者、无意的搭便车者和非自愿搭车者。冒险的搭便车者是指,在小集团的策略性谈判过程中,宁愿放弃未来的可能较大份额而谋求眼前的最大份额的集团成员。无意的搭便车者,则是指奥尔森书中所提到的,大集团中依据理性计算而选择坐享其成的理性的个体成员。而非自愿搭车者,则被定义为在高排他成本和管理结构下,不得不支付他们不需要的物品费用的人(愿意支付的费用低于价格)。(艾伦•斯密德,2006:68-69) 然而本人认为,也许还存在一种极其广泛的搭便车现象,是上述所无法准确的涵盖的。我暂且称之为“文化便车”现象。以他人或他群的思考代替自己的思考,以他人或他群的行为方式代替自己的行为方式,或以遥远的传统或惯例作为现在的价值观和行为准则,而行为者本人几乎不用付出任何努力,只需接受和理解(甚至理解也可有可无)即可。也许有人会说这是模仿和学习文化的过程,但搭文化便车者与模仿和学习文化者的最大区别在于,后者往往需要付出相当的主观努力才能习得所学的东西,而后者基本上不需要为此付出主观的努力或代价,也许可以恰当的称之为“文化惰性”。 路径依赖者,教条主义者,学术抄袭者,盗版者,产品侵权者等等基本上都可以归入此类。很多人已经意识到了这种现象的普遍存在(尤其是在中国),分别提出了学术搭便车行为,企业技术创新搭便车行为等都可以纳入此类。搭“文化便车”者与其他的搭便车者的显著不同在于,他们所“搭乘”的集体物品的性质是典型的“非零和型公共物品”。这种因惰性和利益驱使而导致的“文化便车”现象与其他的搭便车现象相比,一般会对社会带来更大更广泛的负面影响,然而又似乎永远无法完全避免。对“文化便车”我们现在所做的,只是强调严打文化便车者,而在很大程度上忽略了对各种搭文化便车者的具体行为机制和动因等的分析,也忽略了对文化生产者的权益的充分保障。 3,相互依赖情况下搭便车的成因 艾伦•斯密德还讨论了在相互依赖的情况下,导致行动者搭便车的其他因素。这些因素主要包括:一些人隐藏偏好,以期免费获得物品;不公平感(认为别人承担的成本太低);认为过去的交易不公平。双方无权要求对方自律,更促进了搭便车的产生。 4,忽略了其他社会机制对集体行动的影响 面对搭便车困境,奥尔森只提出了一点即“选择性激励“作为解决搭便车问题的方案。然而,他忽略了其他机制在形成集体行动中的作用。比如,马威尔和奥利佛指出,在集体行动过程中有一个临界点机制。为此,他们提出了关键群体理论。费尔曼和甘姆森进一步把选择性激励区分为外在选择性激励和内在选择性激励,并认为奥尔森的理论过于强调前者从而忽视了后者。(赵鼎新,2006:161) 5,意识形态对于发动集体行动的重要性未被有效驳倒 奥尔森曾以国家为例,来反驳感情或意识形态因素对搭便车者的限制。他认为,国家掌握着具有强大感召力的意识形态资源,如爱国主义、民主或共产主义等来赢得国民的团结和支持,然而,没有一个国家能靠自愿的集资或捐款来供养自己,它们只能求助于强制的税款。分析是不错,不过,国家对私人的意识形态控制并非刚性的。官方意识形态在当代社会越来越成为表面文章,实际上更深入人心的是各种民间文化或潜文化。 因此,奥尔森的此段论述似乎不太具有说服力。事实上,从当代社会运动理论的研究中,也可以看到意识形态对集体行动的巨大影响。 6,搭便车的社会后果 在1985年出版的《国家的繁荣》一书中,奥尔森运用本书所提出的集体行动理论从宏观层次上对分利集团的集体行动的社会后果进行了分析。奥尔森认为,任何集团或组织原则上有两条改善成员福利的途径:或者使全社会的生产增加,或者在原有的总产量内为其成员争取更大的份额。在搭便车倾向的诱导下,一般的集团都选择后一条途径,从而成为“分利集团”。这导致国民收入的重新分配,打击全社会的生产积极性,因而引起社会经济效率和总产出的下降。分利集团的行为还会给社会带来很多负面影响。院外游说活动增加了立法的复杂性并扩大了政府的活动范围,而市场中的共谋和有组织的活动则增大了讨价还价的难度和达成协议的复杂性。院外游说活动和卡特尔行为所花费的成本在上产成本中所占比例上升,导致资源浪费。这一事实又进一步影响社会意识和文化,从而改变社会演进的方向。(许云霄,2006:127-129) 然而,搭便车的存在未必会对社会福利造成以上论述的那么大的损失。首先,马威尔和奥利佛指出,现实生活中有两种公共物品。第一种在群体数量增加时它们的好处会减少,比如公路、公园等,因此被称之为“零和型公共物品”。另一种在群体数量增加时,每个个体从中获取的好处并不会减少,比如和平、民主、法制、科技等,因此被称之为“非零和型公共物品”。(赵鼎新,2006:161)除了以上所指出的“文化便车”的特殊情况外,搭“非零和型公共物品”的一般不会带来社会福利的损失,反而有可能增加社会福利。第二,由于现实生活中制约搭便车的因素还有很多,比如以上所提出的意识形态的作用,还有选择性激励的作用,社会关系网络的作用等各种因素大大降低了搭便车的行为发生率。第三,事实证明,尽管中国同样存在许多搭便车现象,尽管中国也存在很多分利集团,但中国的社会总产出和经济效率并未像奥尔森所分析的那样下降,反而飞速增长和发展。不过,这并不足以证明奥尔森的理论是错误的,只能说明奥尔森过于夸大了搭便车和分利集团的负面影响。 10,搭便车理论的适用性问题 奥尔森指出,他的理论的主要考察对象是主要的经济压力集团组织。而在分析一些以社会、政治、宗教或慈善为目的的游说疏通团体时(非经济性利益团体),并不显得很有说服力。该理论对于理性化程度很低的集团也并非十分有效。比如为无谓的事业工作的一群义务工作者。 参考文献 A•艾伦•斯密德,2006,《 财产、权力和公共选择》,黄祖辉等译,上海:上海人民出版社 加里•沃塞曼,1994,《美国政治基础》,陆震纶等译,北京:中国社会科学出版社 曼瑟尔•奥尔森,2003,《集体行动的逻辑》,上海:上海人民出版社 曼瑟尔•奥尔森,2005,《权力与繁荣》,上海:上海人民出版社 赵鼎新,2006,《社会与政治运动讲义》,北京:社会科学文献出版社 许云霄 编著,2006,《公共选择理论》,北京:北京大学出版社 April 17 Iterative methodIn computational mathematics, an iterative method attempts to solve a problem (for example an equation or system of equations) by finding successive approximations to the solution starting from an initial guess. This approach is in contrast to direct methods, which attempt to solve the problem by a finite sequence of operations, and, in the absence of rounding errors, would deliver an exact solution (like solving a linear system of equations Ax = b by Gaussian elimination). Iterative methods are usually the only choice for nonlinear equations. However, iterative methods are often useful even for linear problems involving a large number of variables (sometimes of the order of millions), where direct methods would be prohibitively expensive (and in some cases impossible) even with the best available computing power. [edit] Attractive fixed pointsIf an equation can be put into the form f(x) = x, and a solution x is an attractive fixed point of the function f, then one may begin with a point x1 in the basin of attraction of x, and let xn+1 = f(xn) for n ≥ 1, and the sequence {xn}n ≥ 1 will converge to the solution x. If the function f is continuously differentiable, a sufficient condition for convergence is that the spectral radius of the derivative is strictly bounded by one in a neighborhood of the fixed point. If this condition holds at the fixed point, then a sufficiently small neighborhood (basin of attraction) must exist. [edit] Linear systemsIn the case of a system of linear equations, the two main classes of iterative methods are the stationary iterative methods, and the more general Krylov subspace methods. [edit] Stationary iterative methodsStationary iterative methods solve a linear system with an operator approximating the original one; and based on a measurement of the error (the residual), form a correction equation for which this process is repeated. While these methods are simple to derive, implement, and analyse, convergence is only guaranteed for a limited class of matrices. Examples of stationary iterative methods are the Jacobi method and the Gauss–Seidel method. [edit] Krylov subspace methodsKrylov subspace methods form an orthogonal basis of the sequence of successive matrix powers times the initial residual (the Krylov sequence). The approximations to the solution are then formed by minimizing the residual over the subspace formed. The prototypical method in this class is the conjugate gradient method (CG). Other methods are the generalized minimal residual method (GMRES) and the biconjugate gradient method (BiCG). [edit] ConvergenceSince these methods form a basis, it is evident that the method converges in N iterations, where N is the system size. However, in the presence of rounding errors this statement does not hold; moreover, in practice N can be very large, and the iterative process reaches sufficient accuracy already far earlier. The analysis of these methods is hard, depending on a complicated function of the spectrum of the operator. [edit] PreconditionersThe approximating operator that appears in stationary iterative methods can also be incorporated in Krylov subspace methods such as GMRES (alternatively, preconditioned Krylov methods can be considered as accelerations of stationary iterative methods), where they become transformations of the original operator to a presumably better conditioned one. The construction of preconditioners is a large research area. [edit] HistoryProbably the first iterative method for solving a linear system appeared in a letter of Gauss to a student of his. He proposed solving a 4-by-4 system of equations by repeatedly solving the component in which the residual was the largest. The theory of stationary iterative methods was solidly established with the work of D.M. Young starting in the 1950s. The Conjugate Gradient method was also invented in the 1950s, with independent developments by Cornelius Lanczos, Magnus Hestenes and Eduard Stiefel, but its nature and applicability were misunderstood at the time. Only in the 1970s was it realized that conjugacy based methods work very well for partial differential equations, especially the elliptic type. Gradient descentGradient descent is a first-order optimization algorithm. To find a local minimum of a function using gradient descent, one takes steps proportional to the negative of the gradient (or the approximate gradient) of the function at the current point. If instead one takes steps proportional to the gradient, one approaches a local maximum of that function; the procedure is then known as gradient ascent. Gradient descent is also known as steepest descent, or the method of steepest descent. When known as the latter, gradient descent should not be confused with the method of steepest descent for approximating integrals.
[edit] DescriptionGradient descent is based on the observation that if the real-valued function is defined and differentiable in a neighborhood of a point , then decreases fastest if one goes from in the direction of the negative gradient of F at , . It follows that, if for γ > 0 a small enough number, then . With this observation in mind, one starts with a guess for a local minimum of F, and considers the sequence such that We have so hopefully the sequence converges to the desired local minimum. Note that the value of the step size γ is allowed to change at every iteration. This process is illustrated in the picture to the right. Here F is assumed to be defined on the plane, and that its graph has a bowl shape. The blue curves are the contour lines, that is, the regions on which the value of F is constant. A red arrow originating at a point shows the direction of the negative gradient at that point. Note that the (negative) gradient at a point is orthogonal to the contour line going through that point. We see that gradient descent leads us to the bottom of the bowl, that is, to the point where the value of the function F is minimal. [edit] ExamplesGradient descent has problems with pathological functions such as the Rosenbrock function shown here. The Rosenbrock function has a narrow curved valley which contains the minimum. The bottom of the valley is very flat. Because of the curved flat valley the optimization is zig-zagging slowly with small stepsizes towards the minimum. The gradient ascent method applied to : [edit] CommentsGradient descent works in spaces of any number of dimensions, even in infinite-dimensional ones. In the latter case the search space is typically a function space, and one calculates the Gâteaux derivative of the functional to be minimized to determine the descent direction. Two weaknesses of gradient descent are:
A more powerful algorithm is given by the BFGS method which consists in calculating on every step a matrix by which the gradient vector is multiplied to go into a "better" direction, combined with a more sophisticated line search algorithm, to find the "best" value of γ. Gradient descent is in fact Euler's method for solving ordinary differential equations applied to a gradient flow. As the goal is to find the minimum, not the flow line, the error in finite methods is less significant. [edit] A computational exampleThe gradient descent algorithm is applied to find a local minimum of the function f(x)=x4-3x3+2 , with derivative f'(x)=4x3-9x2. Here is an implementation in the C programming language. #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <math.h> int main () { // From calculation, we expect that the local minimum occurs at x=9/4 // The algorithm starts at x=6 double xOld = 0; double xNew = 6; double eps = 0.01; // step size double precision = 0.00001; while (fabs(xNew - xOld) > precision) { xOld = xNew; xNew = xNew - eps*(4*xNew*xNew*xNew-9*xNew*xNew); } printf ("Local minimum occurs at %lg\n", xNew); } With this precision, the algorithm converges to a local minimum of 2.24996 in 70 iterations. A more robust implementation of the algorithm would also check whether the function value indeed decreases at every iteration and would make the step size smaller otherwise. One can also use an adaptive step size which may make the algorithm converge faster. Method of steepest descentIn mathematics, the steepest descent method or saddle-point approximation is a method used to approximate integrals of the form where f(x) is some twice-differentiable function, M is a large number, and the integral endpoints a and b could possibly be infinite. The technique is also often referred to as Laplace's method, which in fact concerns the special case of real-valued functions f admitting a maximum at a real point.
The idea of Laplace's methodAssume that the function f(x) has a unique global maximum at x0. Then, the value f(x0) will be larger than other values f(x). If we multiply this function by a large number M, the gap between Mf(x0) and Mf(x) will only increase, and then it will grow exponentially for the function As such, significant contributions to the integral of this function will come only from points x in a neighborhood of x0, which can then be estimated. General theory of Laplace's methodTo state and prove the method, we need several assumptions. We will assume that x0 is not an endpoint of the interval of integration, that the values f(x) cannot be very close to f(x0) unless x is close to x0, and that f'''(x0) < 0. We can expand f(x) around x0 by Taylor's theorem, Since f has a global maximum at x0, and since x0 is not an endpoint, it is a stationary point, the derivative of f vanishes at x0. Therefore, the function f(x) may be approximated to quadratic order for x close to x0 (recall that the second derivative is negative at the global maximum f(x0)). The assumptions made ensure the accuracy of the approximation where the integral is taken in a neighborhood of x0. This latter integral is a Gaussian integral if the limits of integration go from −∞ to +∞ (which can be assumed so because the exponential decays very fast away from x0), and thus it can be calculated. We find A generalization of this method and extension to arbitrary precision is provided by Fog (2008). Steepest descentIn extensions of Laplace's method, complex analysis, and in particular Cauchy's integral formula, is used to find a contour of steepest descent for an (asymptotically with large M) equivalent integral, expressed as a line integral. In particular, if no point x0 where the derivative of f vanishes exists on the real line, it may be necessary to deform the integration contour to an optimal one, where the above analysis will be possible. Again the main idea is to reduce, at least asymptotically, the calculation of the given integral to that of a simpler integral that can be explicitly evaluated. See the book of Erdelyi (1956) for a simple discussion (where the method is termed steepest descents). Further generalizationsAn extension of the steepest descent method is the so-called nonlinear stationary phase/steepest descent method. Here, instead of integrals, one needs to evaluate asymptotically solutions of Riemann-Hilbert factorization problems. Given a contour C in the complex sphere, a function f defined on that contour and a special point, say infinity, one seeks a function M holomorphic away from the contour C, with prescribed jump across C, and with a given normalization at infinity. If f and hence M are matrices rather than scalars this is a problem that in general does not admit an explicit solution. An asymptotic evaluation is then possible along the lines of the linear stationary phase/steepest descent method. The idea is to reduce asymptotically the solution of the given Riemann-Hilbert problem to that of a simpler, explicitly solvable, Riemann-Hilbert problem. Cauchy's theorem is used to justify deformations of the jump contour. The nonlinear stationary phase was introduced by Deift and Zhou in 1993, based on earlier work of Its. A (properly speaking) nonlinear steepest descent method was introduced by Kamvissis, K. McLaughlin and P. Miller in 2003, based on previous work of Lax, Levermore, Deift, Venakides and Zhou. The nonlinear stationary phase/steepest descent method has applications to the theory of soliton equations and integrable models, random matrices and combinatorics. Complex integralsFor complex integrals in the form: with t >> 1, we make the substitution t = iu and the change of variable s = c + ix to get the Laplace bilateral transform: We then split g(c+ix) in its real and complex part, after which we recover u = t / i. This is useful for inverse Laplace transforms, the Perron formula and complex integration. Example: Stirling's approximationLaplace's method can be used to derive Stirling's approximation for a large integer N. From the definition of the Gamma function, we have Now we change variables, letting so that Plug these values back in to obtain This integral has the form necessary for Laplace's method with which is twice-differentiable: The maximum of f(z) lies at z0=1, and the second derivative of f(z) has at this point the value -1. Therefore, we obtain [转]金融学、公司金融参考阅读书目和论文(强烈推荐)这是我学校一位教授(美国博士)介绍给我的参考书目(下面注释为该教授所写),主要是金融方面的,侧重Corporate Finance,不是简单的罗列,里面基本都是有价值的文章。主要提供给想做学术的朋友,做学术读大量的文章肯定是必须的,不是非学术所必须。
如果大家喜欢,麻烦顶一下,谢谢! Books
Fama, Eugene. 1976. “Foundations of Finance”. New York: Basic Books. ( 个人认为是最经典的书。写得好,讲得很清晰,有条不紊,读起来有意思。特别是基础不太好的同学,不可不读。) Fama, Eugene., and Miller, Merton. 1972. “The Theory of Finance”. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. (又是一本Fama的书。也很经典,但没什么印象了。) Campbell, J., Lo, A., and MacKinlay, A. 1997. “The Econometrics of Financial Markets”. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cochrane, John, 2001. “Asset Pricing”. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (这就是号称“平生不读Cochrane, 自称Finance 也枉然”的Cochrane的大作。其实,你要是不做Asset Pricing,看懂前几个Chapters足够了。不太明白为什么这本书在中国这么火,莫非中国学生都做Asset pricing? 希望不要弄得又像大炼钢铁一样的结果。) R. Haugen. “Modern Investment Theory”. Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. (有一定难度的书,不知道现在出到几版了。) Elton, E., and Gruber, M. 1995. “Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis”, 5th Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (也不太容易。) Smith, C. 1990. “The Modern Theory of Corporate Finance”. 2nd-edition. McGraw-Hill. (对做corporate finance比较有用。这本书其实就是收录了比较早和比较经典的corporate finance方面的文章。有点像“XX文摘精华版”。现在价值不是很大,因为其中收录的许多文章后面的list里都有。) Asset Pricing, Long-term Performance and Market Efficiency
(这个我不在行,拣我知道的写。) Cochrane, John. “New Facts in Finance”. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. (这是个通俗易读版。适合想要了解一下这个area, 又不想读很多数学的人。) Breeden, Douglas T. 1979. “An Intertemporal Asset Pricing Model with Stochastic Consumption and Investment Opportunities”. Journal of Financial Economics 7, 265-296. (看不懂数学没有关系,关键是看懂intuition.) Merton, Robert. 1973. “An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model”. Econometrica 41, 265-296. (这篇也一样,注重模型的intuition.) Ross, S. 1976, “The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing,” Journal of Economic Theory 13, 341-360. Sharpe, W. 1964. “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk”. Journal of Finance 19, 425-442. Black, F. 1972. "Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing," Journal of Business 45, 444-455. Fama, E. 1991. “Efficient Capital Markets: II”. Journal of Finance 46, 1575-1617. (很长一篇文章,内容又多,当时读得挺痛苦。) Fama, E. 1970. “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work”. Journal of Finance, 383-417. Chordia, Tarun., and Swaminathan, Bhaskaran. 2000. “Trading Volume and Cross-autocorrelations in Stock Returns”. Journal of Finance 55, 913-935. Narasimhan, Jegadeesh., and Titman, Sheridan. 2001. “Profitability of Momentum Strategies: An Evaluation of Alternative Explanations”. Journal of Finance 56, 699-720. Fama, E. and MacBeth, J. 1973. “Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests”.Journal of Political Economy 91, 607-636. (大名鼎鼎的Fama-MacBeth regression 的出处。不过,Economists 好像并不买这个帐,觉得这种方法不make econometric sense. 吾也深有同感也。现在panel data等等都这么发达了,干嘛还死抱这种econometrics上面并不先进的方法不放呢?) Chen, N., Roll, R., and Ross, S. 1986. “Economic Forces and the Stock Market: Testing the APT and Alternative Asset Pricing Theories”. Journal of Business 59, 383-403. (说是叫testing APT, 其实更像testing CAPM. 很有名的,看了就知道。) Fama, E. and French, K. 1989. “Business Conditions and Expected Returns on Stocks and Bonds”. Journal of Financial Economics 25, 23-50. Fama, E. and French, K. 1992. “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns”. Journal of Finance 47,? 427-465. Fama, E. and French, K. 1993. “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds”. Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3-56. (这三篇是Fama-French 的经典三部曲。Three-factor model, five-factor model 就是由此而来。Pontiff 曾经抱怨过,他在Rochester当学生的时候曾想过做个类似的paper, 但老师们告诉他 “You can’t, because there is no theory...” 直到看到Fama-French的paper, 才感叹到,“只要人有名,有没有theory并不重要啊”。) Kothari, S.P., Shanken, J., and Sloan, R. 1995. “Another Look at the Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns”. Journal of Finance 50, 185-224. Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 1994. “Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk”. Journal of Finance 49, 1541-1578. Chan, L., Jegadeesh, N., and Lakonishok, J. 1995. “Evaluating the Performance of Value Versus Glamour Stocks: The Impact of Selection Bias”. Journal of Financial Economics 38, 269-296. Lo, A. W., and MacKinlay, A. 1990. “Data-Snooping Biases in Tests of Financial Asset Pricing Models”. Review of Financial Studies, 3, 431-467. Lewellen J. 1999. "The Time-Series Relations among Expected Returns". Journal of Financial Economics 54, 5-43. (Lewellen 是个美国帅哥, 在MIT做得不错。为人比较能和人交往,presentation 做得很好,属于那种交流表达能力都很出色的人。) Lewellen J., and Shanken, J. 2002. “Learning, Asset-Pricing Tests, and Market Efficiency”. Journal of Finance, 1113-1145. Miller, Edward. 1977. “Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion”. Journal of Finance 32, 11651-1168. Jones, Charles M., and Lamont, Owen. 2002. “Short Sales Constraints and Stock Returns”. Journal of Financial Economics, 207-239. Chen, Joseph., Hong, H., and Stein, J. 2002. “Breadth of Ownership and Stock Returns” Journal of Financial Economics, 171-205. Dechow, Patricia., Hutton, A., Muelbroek, L., and Sloan, R. 2001. “Short Sellers, Fundamental Analysis, and Stock Returns”. Journal of Financial Economics 61, 77-106. (Dechow 和Sloan都是做Accounting的。据说因为合作得太多,两人走到了一起。) Dichev, Ilia D., and Piotroski, J. 2001. “The Long-run Stock Returns Following Bond Ratings Changes”. Journal of Finance 56, 173-203. Ikenberry, David., and Ramnath, Sundaresh. 2002, “Underreaction to Self-selected News Events: The Case of Stock-splits”. Review of Financial Studies 15, 489-526. Titman, Sheridan. 2002. “Discussion of ‘Underreaction to Self-selected News Events: The Case of Stock-splits”. Review of Financial Studies 15, 527-531. Lakonishok, J., and Smidt, S. 1988. “Are Seasonal Anomalies Real? A Ninety-Year Perspective”. Review of Financial Studies 1, 403-427. Lo, A., and MacKinlay, C. 1988. “Stock Market Prices Do Not Follow Random Walks: Evidence from a Simple Specification Test”. Review of Financial Studies 1, 41-66. Keim, D., and Stambaugh, R. 1986. “Predicting Returns in the Stock and Bond Markets”. Journal of Financial Economics 17, 357-390. Ferson, W., and Harvey, C. 1991. “The Variation of Economic Risk Premiums”. Journal of Political Economy 99, 385-415. Conrad, J., and Kaul, G. 1988, “Time Variation in Expected Returns”. Journal of Business, 409-426. Loughran, T., and Ritter, J. 1996, “Long-Term Market Overreaction: The Effect of Low-Priced Stocks”. Journal of Finance, 1959-1970. Boudoukh, J., Richardson, M., and Whitelaw, R. 1994. “A Tale of Three Schools: Insights on Autocorrelations of Short-Horizon Stock Returns”. Review of Financial Studies, 539-573. Jegadeesh, Narasimhan., and Titman, Sheridan. 1993, “Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency”. Journal of Finance 48, 65-91. Daniel, K., and Titman, S. 1997. “Evidence of the Characteristics of Cross Sectional Variation in Stock Returns”. Journal of Finance, 1-33. Jegadeesh, N., and Titman, S. 2001. "Profitability of Momentum Strategies: An Evaluation of Alternative Explanations". Journal of Finance 56, 699-720. Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 1994. “Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk”. Journal of Finance 49, 1541-1578. Grinblatt, M., and Titman, S. 1989. “Portfolio Performance Evaluation: Old Issues and New Insights”. Review of Financial Studies 2, 393-422. Brown, S., Goetzmann, W., Ibbotson, R., and Ross, S. 1992. “Survivorship Bias in Performance Studies”. Review of Financial Studies 5, 553-580. Fama, Eugene., and French, Kenneth. 1996. “Multifactor Explanations of Asset-pricing Anomalies”. Journal of Finance 51, 55-84. Breeden, D., Gibbons, M., and Litzenberger, R. 1989. “Empirical Tests of the Consumption Oriented CAPM”. Journal of Finance 44, 231-262. Chan, K. C., Chen, N., and Hsieh, D. 1985. “An Exploratory Investigation of the Firm Size Effect”. Journal of Financial Economics 14, 451-471. Amihud, Y., and Mendelson, H. 1986. “Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread”. Journal of Financial Economics 17, 223-249. Ritter, J. 1991. “The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings”. Journal of Finance, 3-27. (Ritter 是long-term performance的开山祖师,提到long-term performance不能不提Ritter。另外,他也是IPO的大家,对IPO感兴趣的可去他的网站看看。) Loughran, T., and Ritter, J. 1995. “The New Issues Puzzle”. Journal of Finance, 23-51. (是上一篇的加强版。) Schultz, P. 2003. “Pseudo Market Timing and the Long-Run Underperformance of IPOs,” Journal of Finance 58, 483-518. (90年代中期,关于long-term performance measurement的问题吵得热火朝天,至到现在。) Barber, B., and Lyon, J. 1996. “Detecting Abnormal Operating Performance: The Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics”. Journal of Financial Economics 41, 359-99. Banking Diamond, Douglas W., and Dybvig, Philip H. 1983. “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance,and Liquidity”, Journal of Political Economy, 91, 401 - 419. (Banking中的经典,虽然我不是做banking的,但认为不可不读) Diamond, Douglas W. 1997. “Liquidity, Banks, and Markets”, Journal of Political Economy, 105, 928-956. Calomiris, Charles W., and Kahn, Charles. 1991. “The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements”. American Economic Review 81, 497-513. Kashyap, Anil K., Rajan, Raghuram., and Stein, Jeremy C. 2002. “Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-taking”. Journal of Finance 57, 33-73. Allen, Franklin., and Gale, Douglas. 1998. “Optimal Financial Crises”. Journal of Finance, 53, 1245-1284. Allen, Franklin. 2001. “Presidential Address: Do Financial Institutions Matter?”. Journal of Finance, 56, 1165 - 1175. Allen, Franklin., and Santomero, Anthony M. 1998. “The Theory of Financial Intermediation”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 21, 1461-1485. Billett, Matthew T., Flannery, Mark J., and Garfinkel, Jon A. 1995. “The Effect of Lender Identity on a Borrowing Firm's Equity Return”. Journal of Finance, 50, 699-718. Behavioral Finance:
这是finance新兴的一个方向。主要是结合Asset Pricing 和Corporate Finance的理论加进心理学的一些东西进行empirical 方面的研究。其在Asset Pricing 这个方面主要是mispricing 的研究,Corporate Finance这个方面可就多了。这里面的大家当然要属老当益壮的Richard Thaler, 和后起之秀Jeffery Wurgler. 大名鼎鼎的Shleifer也做不少这方面的研究。读了下面的几篇papers你应该能感觉到Behavioral Finance 是做什么的。感兴趣的,自已去他们的website把他们的papers都读一遍吧。 Barberis, Nicholas and Thaler, Richard H. 2003. "A Survey of Behavioral Finance". Handbook of the Economics of Finance. Baker, Malcolm., Ruback, Richard., and Wurgler, Jeffery. 2004. “Behavioral Corporate Finance: A Survey”. Handbook of Empirical Corporate Finance. Hirshleifer, D. 2001. “Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing”. Journal of Finance, 1533-1597. Fama, E. 1998. “Market Efficiency, Long-term Returns, and Behavioral Finance”. Journal of Financial Economics, 283-306. (该文曾获JFE大奖。Fama 是个死忠 “Market is efficient” 的人,应此对他的观点要持一定的怀疑态度。) Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. 1997. “The Limits of Arbitrage”, Journal of Finance, 52, 35-55. Malmendier, U., and Tate, G. 2005. “CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment”. Journal of Finance, 2661-2700. (这两个人都挺有个性。Malmendier 是个欧洲女孩,一头金发。听说以前是练体操的,难怪身材特像小女孩。加上说话又快,往前面一站就像个高中生。Tate 是个美国帅哥,Wharton的教授。很儒雅,说话也有板有眼。应该是许多女生的偶像。) Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 1998. “A Model of Investor Sentiment”. Journal of Financial Economics, 307-343. Baker, M., and Wurgler, J. 2000. “The Equity Share in New Issues and Aggregate Stock Returns”. Journal of Finance 55, 2219-2257. (Wurgler的处女作,也是这篇文章开始引起人们的注意。) Heaton, J. 2002. “Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance”. Financial Management, 33-45. Corporate Finance:
Introduction and Overview of Corporate Finance Brennan, 1995, “Corporate finance over the past 25 years”, Financial Management 24, Summer, 9-22. Hart, O., 1989, “An economist’s perspective on the theory of the firm”, Columbia Law Review 89, 1757-1774. Williamson, O., 1981, “The modern corporation: origins, evolution, attributes”, Journal of Economic Literature 1537-1568. Graham, J. and Harvey, C. 2000. “The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: Evidence from the Field”. Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187-244. Corporate Finance:
Agency Theory and Ownership Fama, E., and Jensen, M. 1983. “Agency Problems and Residual Claims”. Journal of Law and Economics, 327-349. Fama, E., and Jensen, M. 1983. “Separation of Ownership and Control”. Journal of law and economics, 301-325.(美国现代金融Agency Theory 的开山之作。不过这两篇写得不是很好。非要两篇一起看才看得明白。) Fama, E. 1978. “The Effects of a Firm’s Investment and Financing Decisions on the Welfare of Its Securityholders”. American Economic Review 68, 272-284. (这其实不完全算Agency theory, 但他用很通俗的英语解释了一个有意思的问题。) Jensen, M., and Meckling, W. 1976. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," Journal of Financial Economics, 305-360. (这么经典的paper 就不用多介绍了吧。) Demsetz. 1983. “The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm”. Journal of Law and Economics 26, 375-390. (Demsetz关于ownership的看法别具一格。和上面的Jensen-Meckling对照着读更有体会。) Jensen, M. 1986. “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers”. American Economic Review, 323-329. (在Corporate Finance领域家喻户晓的paper. 其他Finance的人没读过也基本上听说过。) Myers, S. 1977. “The Determinants of Corporate Borrowing”. Journal of Financial Economics 5, 146-175. (将agency problem between bondholders and stockholders 与firm’s investment strategy 联系起来的经典文章。) Parrino, R., and Weisbach, M. 1999. “Measuring Investment Distortions Arising from Stockholder-bondholder Conflict”. Journal of Financial Economics 53, 3-42 (也是获奖之作。方法很新颖,有创意,居然能想出用simulation来做corporate finance。不过,如果不是Weisbach, 估计也不好发。做research 就是这样,名人尝试新东西叫有创意,不出名的人尝试新东西叫冒险。) Harford, J. 1999. “Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions”. Journal of Finance 54, 1969-1997. (Jarrad 也是少年成名,是Rochester毕业,JFE的嫡系部队。大概是JFE最年轻的Associate Editor. 目前corporate finance领域最出名的年轻俊杰之一。) Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R., and Williamson, R. 1999. “The Determinants and Implications of Corporate Cash Holdings”. Journal of Financial Economics, 52, 3-46. Lie, E. 2000. “Excess Funds and Agency Problems: An Empirical Study of Incremental Cash Disbursements”. Review of Financial Studies 13, 219-248. Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 1988. “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis”. Journal of Financial Economics, 293-315. Corporate Finance:
Information, Investors and Corporate Policy 这里面有些不属于corporate finance 的范畴。他山之石,可以攻玉,知识面广一些对做research很有好处。不同领域本来就有交叉,想分很清楚也不太容易。 Akerlof, George. 1970. “The market for “lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 89, 488-500. (要是让我列个My favorite Top 10 papers, 这篇文章绝对在其中。Akerlof 居然用最最简单的model, 来把一个最最复杂的理论解释得清清楚楚,难怪能得诺贝尔奖。现在有些人正好相反,用最最复杂的model, 把一个最最简单的理论解释得晕头转向。这些人其实不应该做finance, 应该去搞数学或物理。) Ross, S. 1977. “The Determinants of Capital Structure: The Incentive-signaling Approach”. Bell Journal of Economics 8, 23-40. (Ross的这篇也很经典。提起他大多数人会想起APT, 其实他对corporate finance 贡献也很大。这篇很有上面提到的Akerlof的风格,都是用很简单的model阐述一个深奥的理论。Ross这个人也很不错,平易近人,很幽默,健谈,没有一点架子,和谁都能见面熟。人格魅力指数:100/100。) Myers, S.C., and Majluf, N.? 1984. “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have”. Journal of Financial Economics, 187-221. (影响很大的一篇文章。后来的IPO underpricing 和 Pecking order theory 等等许多都基于此。可以说对corporate finance 各个领域都有影响。) Hart, O. 2001. “Financial Contracting”. Journal of Economic Literature 39, 1079-1100. Thakor. 1989. “Strategic Issues in Financial Contracting: An Overview”. Financial Management, 39-58. Spence, Michael. 1973. “Job market signaling”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 355-74. Rothschild, Michael., and Stiglitz, Joseph. 1976. “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: an Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 629-649. Grossman, Sanford., and Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1980. “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets”. American Economic Review, 70, 393-408. Merton, Robert C. 1987. “A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information”. Journal of Finance, 483-510. Corporate Finance:
Capital Structure, Financing Decisions, Investment and Taxes Miller, M., and Modigliani, F. 1958.“The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment”. American Economic Review, 261-297. (什么,没读过?你洗洗睡吧。少数几篇做Finance而获诺贝尔经济学奖的大作,不读不行。) Miller, M., and Modigliani, F. 1963. “Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction”. American Economic Review, 433-443. (这是他们AER1958大作的续篇。那篇大作中有一处错误,但当时没有什么人能看得懂这篇划时代的巨作,就像爱因斯坦当年发表相对论一样。直到5年后被他们自己发现,才有了这篇文章。不过,原文的结论不受影响,所以他们才在30几年后得了诺贝尔奖。) Harris, M. and A. Raviv. 1991. “The Theory of Capital Structure”. Journal of Finance, 297-368. (MM之后capital structure基本上被做烂了,文章数量只能用汗牛充栋来形容。看这篇review paper 能让你少看不少papers.) Baker, M., and Wurgler, J. 2002. “Market Timing and Capital Structure”, Journal of Finance, 1-32. (一篇很有创意的文章,算是behavioral corporate finance 最有代表性的佳作。该文引起很大争议,到今天批它的文章恐怕只有用过江之鲫来形容。到不是这俩人对头多,只是这篇文章影响太大,批它比批一篇不出名的文章更容易引起人们的兴趣,和方舟子打假有点相似。) Frank, M., and Goyal, V. 2003. “Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 67, 217-248. (很有名的一篇paper, 虽然我不太喜欢。该文曾获JFE的奖,是近年来在capital structure这个领域有影响的文章。) Mehrotra, V., Mikkelson, M., and Partch, M. 2003. “The Design of Financial Policies in Corporate Spin-offs”. Review of Financial Studies 16, 1359-1388. (Idea有新意。Mikkelson 曾报怨这篇paper被under appreciated。) Berger, P., Ofek, E., and Yermack, D. 1997. “Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions”. Journal of Finance, 1411-1437. Masulis, R., 1980. “The Effects of Capital Structure Change on Security Prices: A Study of Exchange Offers”. 1980. Journal of Financial Economics, 139-178. Chemmanur, T., and Paolo, F. 1999. “A Theory of the Going-Public Decision”. Review of Financial Studies 12, 249-279. Dunbar, C. 1995. “The Use of Warrants as Underwriter Compensation in Initial Public Offerings”. Journal of Financial Economics 38, 59-78. DeAngelo, H., and Masulis, R. 1980. “Optimal Capital Structure under Corporate and Personal Taxation”. Journal of Financial Economics 8, 3-29. Miller, M. 1977. “Debt and Taxes”. Journal of Finance 32, 261-275. Graham, J. 2000. “How Big are the Tax Benefits of Debt?”. Journal of Finance 55, 1901-1941. (Graham 是个很能想很有创意的人。本来这个topic都被做烂了,但他能想出一些个很新奇很有创造性的方法去做。佩服ing. ) Graham, J. 2003. “Taxes and Corporate Finance: A Review”. Review of Financial Studies 16, 1075-1129. Kaplan, S., and Stromberg, P. 2003. “Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts”. Review of Economic Studies, 285-315. Andrade, G., and Kaplan, G. 1998. “How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed”. Journal of Finance 53, 1443-1493. (题目是不是不好懂?Kaplan的一贯风格是用data来轰炸你,弄得你晕头转向。看过这篇就有体会了。) Kaplan, S., and Zingales, L. 1997. “Do Financing Constraints Explain Why Investment Is Correlated With Cash Flow?”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 169-215. (Cash flow sensitivity 的争论就是他们搞起来的。) Gertner, R., and Scharfstein, D. 1991. “A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law”. Journal of Finance 46, 1189-1222. Froot, K., Scharfstein, D., and Stein, J. 1993. “Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies”. Journal of Finance 48, 1629-1658. Fama, E., and French, K. 2005. “Financing Decisions: Who Issues Stock”. Journal of Financial Economics, 549-582. Fama, E., and French, K. 2002. "Testing Tradeoff and Pecking Order Predictions about Dividends and Debt". Review of Financial Studies, 1-37. (读Fama-French的文章有时候并不一定因为是篇好文,只是因为别人都读。) Corporate Finance:
Corporate Governance Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 1997. “A Survey of Corporate Governance”. Journal of Finance, 737- 783. (做corporate governance 的如何能够不读这篇paper. Corporate governance 这个词就是他们定义出来的。) La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 2000. “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance”. Journal of Financial Economics, 3-27. Brickley, J., Coles, J., and Terry,R. 1994. “Outside Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills”. Journal of Financial Economics 35, 371-390. Byrd, J., and Hickman, K. 1992. “Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence from Tender Offer Bids”. Journal of Financial Economics 32, 195-222. Core, J., Holthausen, R., and Larcker, D. 1999. “Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance”. Journal of Financial Economics 51, 371-406. Cotter, J., Shivdasani, A., and Zenner, M. 1997. “Do Independent Directors Enhance Target Shareholders Wealth During Tender Offers?”. Journal of Financial Economics 43, 195-218. Harford, J. 2003. “Takeover Bids and Target Directors’ Incentives: The Impact of a Bid on Directors’ Wealth and Board Seats”. Journal of Financial Economics, 51-83. Denis, D., and Sarin, A. 1999. “Ownership and Board Structures in Publicly Traded Corporations”. Journal of Financial Economics 52, 187-224. Del Guercio, D., Dann, L., and Partch, Megan. 2003. “Governance and Boards of Directors in Close-end Investment Companies”. Journal of Financial Economics 69, 111-152. Gompers, P., Ishii, J., and Metrick, A. 2003. “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107-155. (这篇文章也有些争议,不过现在是被引用得越来越多了。) Hermalin, B., and Weisbach, M. 1988. “The Determinants of Board Composition”. RAND Journal of Economics 19, 589-606. Hermalin, B., and Weisbach, M. 2003. “Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: a Survey of the Economic Literature”. Federal Reserve Bank at New York, Economic policy review, April 2003. (一篇survey paper,虽然不是发表在学术期刊上,但值得一读。) Jensen, M. 1993. “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems”. Journal of Finance, 831-880. (记得是Jensen在某一年的讲话,读一下吧。) Mikkelson, W., and Partch, M. 1997. “The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary Managerial Turnover”. Journal of Financial Economics 44, 205-228. (1997年获JFE大奖的文章。觉得还是挺有创意的。) Weisbach, M. 1988. “Outside Directors and CEO Turnover”. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 431-460. (最早的一篇研究board composition 对corporate policy影响。) Yermack, D. 1996. “Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors”. Journal of Financial Economics 40, 185-211. (最早研究board size对firm value的影响。Yermack很会充分利用data,他用这套数据写了好几篇文章。) Shivdasani, A., and Yermack, D. 1999. “CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Member: an Empirical Analysis”. Journal of Finance 54, 1829-1853. Yermack, D. 2004. “Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors”. Journal of Finance 59, 2281-2308. Rosenstein, S., and Wyatt, J. 1997. “Inside Directors, Board Effectiveness, and Shareholder Wealth”. Journal of Financial Economics 44, 229-248. Shivdasani, Anil. 1993. “Board Composition, Ownership Structure and Hostile Takeovers”. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 167–198. (忘了这篇文章为什么有名,好像是找到了关于busy directors 的什么,引起后来的争论。) Fich, E., and Shivdasani, A. 2006. “Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors”. Journal of Finance, 689-724. (Shivdasani 是个印度人,但英语说得基本上没什么口音。应该什么时候把他请过来教一教如何练口语。) Ferris, S., Jagannathan, M., and Pritchard, A. 2003. “Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments”. Journal of Finance, 1087-1112. Vafeas, Nikos. 1999. “Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance”. Journal of Financial Economics, 113–142. (这是一篇典型的data mining的文章。其实hypothesis一点都不make sense, 但结果够噱头,就可在JFE上发。我们从中要学到的是先要看data, 如果结果够interesting, 再来写文章。) Perry, Tod., and Peyer, Urs. 2005. “Board Seat Accumulation by Executives: A Shareholder's Perspective”. Journal of Finance, 2083–2123. (算是the board of directors 比较新的研究了。忘了好在哪里。) Corporate Finance:
Mergers and Acquisitions Mitchell, M. And Mulherin, J. 1996. “The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity”. Journal of Financial Economics, 193-229. (这篇很经典,提出了M&A几个原因之一。) Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. 2003. “Stock Market Driven Acquisitions". Journal of Financial Economics, 295-311. (现代M&A理论中很有名的一篇,也和behavioral finance 沾边。但我觉得model并不很好反映他们的理论。Model 说的其实是mispricing driven acquisitions, 而他们想表达的意思应该比这广。) Jensen, M., and Ruback, R. 1983. “The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence”. Journal of Financial Economics, 5-50. (关于M&A最早,也是被研究的最多的观点 –The market for corporate control. ) Harford, J. 2005. “What Drives Merger Waves?”. Journal of Financial Economics, 529-560. Jarrell, G.A., Brickley, J. and Netta, J. 1988. “The Market for Corporate control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980.”? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2:49-68. Travlos, Nickolaos. 1987. “Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding Firm’s Stock Returns”. Journal of Finance 42, 943-963. Stulz, R. 1988. “Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financial Policies and the Market for Corporate Control”. Journal of Financial Economics, 25-54. (我觉得还不错,但现在好像引用的少了。不过就冲Rene Stulz的大名,也值得一读。) Healy, Paul., Palepu, Krishna., and Ruback, Richard. 1992. “Does Corporate Performance Improve after Mergers?”. Journal of Financial Economics 31, 135-175. Halpern, Paul. 1982. “Corporate Acquisitions: A Theory of Special Cases? A Review of Event Studies Applied to Acquisitions”. Journal of Finance 38, 297-317. Fuller, K., Netter, J., and Stegemoller, M. 2002. “What do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions”. Journal of Finance, 1763-1793. Ecobo, Espen. 1983. “Horizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder Wealth”. Journal of Financial Economics 11, 241-273. Roll, Richard. 1983. “The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers”. Journal of Business 59, 197-216. (都知道Roll对Asset Pricing 的贡献,却不知他对behavioral corporate finance 也有独到的眼光。) Fama, E., Fisher, L., Jensen, M., and Roll, Richard. 1969. “The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information”. International Economic Review 1, 1-21. (Event studies 的始作俑者。) Dodd, P., and Warner, J. 1983. “On Corporate Governance: a Study of Proxy Contests”. Journal of Financial Economics 11, 401 - 438. (Event studies 的名篇,不过到今天event studies 已经不是什么了不起的事,大家也渐渐的不引用这些文章了, 直接做就行了。下面三篇也是同样情况。) Brown, Stephen., and Warner, Jerold. 1980. “Measuring Security Price Performance”. Journal of Financial Economics 8, 205-285. Brown, Stephen., and Warner, Jerold. 1985. “Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies”. Journal of Financial Economics 14, 3-32. MacKinlay, C. 1997. “Event Studies in Economics and Finance”. Journal of Economic Literature 35, 13-39. Dann, L.Y., and DeAngelo, H. 1983. “Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated Stock Repurchases and the Market for Corporate Control”. Journal of Financial Economics, 275-300. Martin, K., and McConnell, J. 1991. “Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover”. Journal of finance, 671-687. Kaplan, S., and Weisbach, M. 1992. “The Success of Acquisitions: Evidence from Diverstitures”. Journal of Finance 47, 107-138. Kaplan, S. 1989. “The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value”. Journal ofFinancial Economics 24, 217-254. (Kaplan就是搞这个起家的。他也带动了研究MBO的潮流。) Kaplan, S., and Stein, J. 1990. “How Risky is the Debt in Highly Leveraged Transactions?”. Journal of Financial Economics, 215-246. (LBO也是他的最爱。) 下面几篇我都不太了解,都比较早了。有空就翻翻吧。
Agarwal, A., Jaffe, J., and Mandelker, G. 1992. “The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly.”? The Journal of Finance, 1605-1621.
Opler, T., and Titman, S. 1993. “The Determinants of Leveraged Buyout Activity: Free Cash Flow vs. Financial Distress Costs”. The Journal of Finance, 1985-1999. Comment, R. and Schwert, G. 1995. “Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeovers Measures”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3-43. Corporate Finance:
Payout Policy Payout policy 本身并没什么有趣的,一般都是和Agency theory, Information asymmetry (Signaling) 或Mispricing 结合在一起才有意思。 Allen, F., and Michaelly, R. 2003. “Payout Policy”. Chapter 7, 337-430, in Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Edited by Constantindes et al, Elsevier North Holland. (这是篇review paper,看了就对这个领域有个大概的印象。) Fama, E., and French, K. 2001. “Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay?”. Journal of Financial Economics 60, 3-43. (Fama又一篇获奖之作,也很是有名。) Baker, Malcolm., and Wurgler, Jeffrey. 2004. "A Catering Theory of Dividends". Journal of Finance, 1125-1165. (Payout policy 和Behavioral finance结合的代表作。) Baker, Malcolm., and Wurgler, Jeffrey. 2004. "Appearing and Disappearing of Dividends: The Link to Catering Incentives". Journal of Financial Economics, 271-288. (感觉不如上面那篇JF。搞什么嘛,简直就是overkill.) Miller, M., and Rock, K. 1985. “Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information”. Journal of Finance, 1031-1051. (翻一下,记住结论即可。) Benartzi, S., Michaely, R., and Thaler, R. 1997. “Do Changes in Dividends Signal the Future or the Past?”. Journal of Finance, 1007-1033. (关于dividend signaling 的争论就一直没停过, 实在是让人感到有些疲劳。) Litner, J. 1956. “Distribution of Incomes of Corporations among Dividends, Retained Earnings and Taxes,” American Economic Review, 97-113. (大概是第一个研究这个方面的paper,其model至到今天还在被用。) Grullon, G., and Michaely, R. 2002. “Dividends, Share Repurchases and the Substitution Hypothesis”. Journal of Finance 62, 1649-1684. (这两人原系师徒。这篇paper写的不是很好,但还算有名。) Vermaelen, T. 1981. “Common Stock Repurchases and Market Signaling: An Empirical Study”. Journal of Financial Economics, 139-183. (老文了。本来也被引用得不怎么多,但近年来人气很旺,不知何故。读读吧。) Dann, L. 1981. “Common Stock Repurchases: An Analysis of Returns to Bondholders and Stockholders”. Journal of Financial Economics 9, 113-138. (老Larry也是有些点背,本来这篇paper比上面Vermaelen的那篇要引用的多,但不知何故近来少有人引用。) Easterbrook, Frank. 1984. “Two Agency-cost Explanations of Dividends”. American Economic Review, 650-659. (该人系lawyer出身,因此很遭某些人排斥。) Fenn, G., and Liang, N. 2001. “Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial Stock Incentives”. Journal of Financial Economics 60, 45-72. Bhattacharya, S. 1979. “Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and 'The Bird in the Hand Fallacy'”. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 259-270. (一篇老文,很多人引用。翻翻就可以了。) Guay, Wayne., and Harford, J. 2000. “The Cash-Flow Permanence and Information Content of Dividend Increases vs. Repurchases”. Journal of Financial Economics 57, 385-415.? (Guay是accounting 里的青年才俊,在Wharton做的不错. 和Harford以前读书时是同学,据说网球打得很好。) Jagannathan, M., Stephens, C., and Weisbach, M. 2000. “Financial Flexibility and the Choice between Dividends and Stock Repurchases”. Journal of Financial Economics 57, 355-384. (和上面那篇paper讲的是差不多的意思。这篇明显有些赶工的痕迹。大概是为了抢着发表。这两篇最后都在同一本杂志的同一期上发了,要是不抢,让上面那篇先发,这篇就发不了了。) DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., and Skinner, D. 1996. “Reversal of Fortune, Dividend Signaling and the Disappearance of Sustained Earnings Growth”. Journal of Financial Economics 40, 341-371. (又是一篇signaling 的paper。DeAngelo两人对dividends情有独钟,大部分文章都和dividends 有关。感兴趣的可以去他们网页看看,这里就不多举了。) Kahle, K. 2002. “When a Buyback isn’t a Buyback: Open-market Repurchases and Employee Options”. Journal of Financial Economics 63, 235-261. Stephens, C., and Weisbach, M. 1998. “Actual Share Reacquisitions in Open-market Repurchase Programs”. Journal of Finance 55, 313-334. Ikenburry, D., Lakonishock, J. and Vermaelen, T. 1995. “Market Underreaction to Open Market Stock Repurshases”. Journal of Financial Economics, 405-435. Healy, P. and Palepu, K. 1988. “Earnings Information Conveyed by Dividend Initiations and Omissions”. Journal of Financial Economics, 149-175. Michaely, R., Thaler, R., and Womack, K. 1995. “Piece Reactions to Dividend Intention and Omissions: Overreaction or Drift?”.? Journal of Finance, 573-608. John, K., and Williams, J. 1985. “Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: a Signaling Equilibrium”. Journal of Finance 40, 1053-1070. (老文,翻一下,记住结论即可。) Grullon, Gustavo., Michaely, Roni. 2004. “The Information Content of Share Repurchase Programs”. Journal of Finance, 651-680. Elton, E., and Gruber, M. 1970. “Marginal Stockholders’ Tax Rates and the Clientele Effect”. Review of Economics and Statistics 52, 68-74. (比较早的一篇关于clientele effects和dividends的文章。现在这种文章海量了,感兴趣的自己搜好了。) International Finance
这个我不太了解,推荐几篇我知道的吧。其实说穿了基本上也就是用international data来验证已有的theory, 不会去做些什么汇率之类啦,跨国银行之类啦,FDI等等。在美国,上面提到的那些东西可都是属于经济系(Economics), 和金融(Finance)不怎么沾边。 Doidge, C. 2004. “US Cross-listing and the Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from Dual Class Firms”. Journal of Financial Economics, 519-554. (Craig 是加拿大帅哥,当年为了女友,毅然选择了去U of Toronto. 他应该是近几年来Ohio State 所毕业的最出色的学生之一。当年他选择这个dissertation topic 是冒了风险的,因为不是所有人对international data都是那么相信的。有句话怎么说的, “Great achievements involve great risk”. ) Doidge, C., Karolyi, C., and Stulz, R. 2004. “Why are Foreign Firms that are Listed in the US Worth More?”. Journal of Financial Economics, 205-238. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. 1999. “Corporate Ownership around the World”. Journal of Finance, 471-517. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 2000. “Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World”. Journal of Finance, 1-33. Morck, R., Yeung, B., and Wu, W. 2000. “The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?”. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58, 215-260. Mutual Funds
Johnson, Woodrow. 2003. “Predictable Investment Horizons and Wealth Transfers among Mutual Fund Shareholders”. 2004. Journal of Finance, 1979-2012. (Columbia 毕业的,和去Connell的那个中国女孩是同学。人很聪明,很有才华,但对学生很一般般。个人认为此文是econometrics 技巧在finance papers中的最完美应用之一篇经典。) Chan, Louis K. C., Chen, Hsiu-Lang., and Lakonishok, Josef. 2002. “On Mutual Fund Investment Styles”. Review of Financial Studies, 1407-1437. Hendricks, D., Patel. J., and Zeckhauser, R. 1993. “Hot Hands in Mutual Funds: Short-run Persistence of Relative Performance, 1974-1988”. Journal of Finance 48, 93-130. Grinblatt, M., and Titman, T. 1993. “Performance Measurement without Benchmarks: An Examination of Mutual Fund Returns”. Journal of Business 66, 47-68. Carhart, Mark. 1997. “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance”. Journal of Finance 52, 57-82. (Chicago 毕业的,好像是Fama的高足。该文是第一个提出survivorship bias的,非常之经典。) Del Guercio, D. 1996. "The Distorting Effect of the Prudent-Man Laws on Institutional Equity Investors," Journal of Financial Economics 40, 31-62. (Diane 对学生比较负责,愿意花很多时间指导学生。为人也很smooth,年轻时是美女,穿着也很有品。) Coval, Joshua D., and Moskowitz, T. 1999. “Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios”. Journal of Finance 54, 2045-2073. Gompers, Paul., and Metrick, A. 2001. “Institutional Investors and Equity Prices”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 229-259. Jensen, Michael. 1968. “The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964”. Journal of Finance, 23, 389-416. (Mutual funds 最早也是最有名的经典之一。Jensen’s Alpha 总该听说过吧?就是源自此处。) Zheng, Lu. 1999. “Is Money Smart? A Study of Mutual Fund Investors' Fund Selection Ability”. Journal of Finance, 54, 901-933. (中国美女的大作,推一下。她是Yale毕业的,后来去了Michigan. 这篇文章好像得了个奖。) Edelen, Roger. 1999. “Investor Flows and the Assessed Performance of Open-end Mutual Funds”. Journal of Financial Economics 53, 439-466. (也很经典。好像就是他引起了flow 和 performance之间的热潮。) Edelen, Roger., and Warner, J. 2001. “Aggregate Price Effects of Institutional Trading: a Study of Mutual Fund Flow and Market Returns”. Journal of Financial Economics, 59, 195-220. Brown, Keith C., Harlow, W., and Starks, L. 1996. “Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry”. Journal of Finance, 51, 85-110. Chalmers, John., Roger, Edelen., and Kadlec, G. 2001. “On the Perils of? Financial Intermediaries Setting Security Prices: the Mutual Fund Wild Card Option”. Journal of Finance, 2209-2236. (算是近几年来mutual funds里比较有名的一篇。题目很古怪,其实就是说各个地方trading时间上的差异导致managers有机可乘。 Chevalier, Judith., and Ellison, G. 1999. “A Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 389-432. Falkenstein, Eric G. 1996. “Preferences for Stock Characteristics as Revealed by Mutual Fund Portfolio Holdings”. Journal of Finance, 111-135. Warther, Vincent A. 1995. “Aggregate Mutual Fund Flows and Security Returns”. Journal of Financial Economics, 209-235. Sirri, Erik., and Tufano, P. 1998. “Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows”. Journal of Finance 53, 1589-1622. Gruber, Martin. 1996. “Another Puzzle: the Growth in Actively Managed Mutual Funds.” Journal of Finance 51, 783-810. Reuter, J. 2006. “Are IPO Allocations for Sale? Evidence from Mutual Funds”. Journal of Finance, 2289-2324. (Jon毕业于MIT,大概是我见过的人当中最聪明的一个,虽然他现在还不怎么有名。为人超好, 非常非常nice, 也很正直。个人认为Jon是个很值得结交的人。如有机会当他学生,一定要选他当committee member. 好人指数:100/100。) Market Microstructure
Kyle, Albert S. 1985. “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading”. Econometrica, 53, 1315-1335.
Glosten, Lawrence., and Milgrom, P. 1985. “Bid, Ask and Transcation Prices in a Dealer Market with Heterogenously Informed Traders”. Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 71-100. O'Hara, Maureen. 2003. “Presidential Address: Liquidity and Price Discovery”. Journal of Finance, 58, 1335-1354. Madhavan, A. 2002. “Market Microstructure: A Practitioner's Guide”. Financial Analysts Journal, 58, 28-42. Harriss, J. H., and Schultz, P. 1998. “The Trading Profits of SOES Bandits”. Journal of Financial Economics, 50, 39-62. Harris, Lawrence and Hasbrouck, J. 1996. “Market vs. Limit Orders: The Superdot Evidence on Order Submission Strategy”. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31, 213-231. Jones, Charles M., and Lipson, M. 2001. “Sixteenths: Direct Evidence on Institutional Execution Costs”. Journal of Financial Economics, 59, 253-278. Schultz, Paul. 2001. “Corporate Bond Trading Costs: a Peek Behind the Curtain”. Journal of Finance, 677-698. April 15 佛洛伊德 弗洛伊德的精神分析理论
精神分析理论属于心理动力学理论,是奥地利精神科医生弗洛伊德于19世纪末20世纪初创立。精神分析理论是现代心理学的奠基石,它的影响远不是局限于临床心理学领域,对于整个心理科学乃至西方人文科学的各个领域均有深远的影响,它的影响可与达尔文的进化论相提并论。它有以下几种基本理论: 一、精神层次理论 该理论是阐述人的精神活动,包括欲望、冲动、思维,幻想、判断、决定、情感等等、会在不同的意识层次里发生和进行。不同的意识层次包括意识,前意识,潜意识和三个层次,好像深浅不同的地壳层次而存在,故称之为精神层次。 人的心理活动有些是能够被自己觉察到的,只要我们集中注意力,就会发觉内心不断有一个个观念、意象或情感流过,这种能够被自己意识到的心理活动叫做意识。而一些本能冲动、被压抑的欲望或生命力却在不知不觉的潜在境界里发生,因不符合社会道德和本人的理智,无法进入意识被个体所觉察,这种潜伏着的无法被觉察的思想、观念、欲望等心理活动被称之为潜意识。下意识乃界于意识与潜意识的层次中间,一些不愉快或痛苦的感觉、觉、意念、回忆常被压存在下意识这个层次、一般情况下不会被个体所觉察,但当个体的控制能力松懈时比如醉酒、催眠状态或梦境中,偶尔会暂时出现在意识层次里、让个体觉察到。 二、人格结构理论 弗洛伊德认为人格结构由本我、自我、超我三部分组成。 本我即原我,是指原始的自己,包含生存所需的基本欲望、冲动和生命力。本我是一切心理能量之源,本我按快乐原则行事,它不理会社会道德、外在的行为规范,它唯一的要求是获得快乐,避免痛苦,本我的目标乃是求得个体的舒适,生存及繁殖,它是无意识的,不被个体所觉察。 自我,其德文原意即是指“自己”,是自己可意识到的执行思考、感觉、判断或记忆的部分,自我的机能是寻求“本我”冲动得以满足,而同时保护整个机体不受伤害,它遵循的是“现实原则”,为本我服务。 超我,是人格结构中代表理想的部分,它是个体在成长过程中通过内化道德规范,内化社会及文化环境的价值观念而形成,其机能主要在监督、批判及管束自己的行为,超我的特点是追求完美,所以它与本我一样是非现实的,超我大部分也是无意识的,超我要求自我按社会可接受的方式去满足本我,它所遵循的是“道德原则”。 三、性本能理论 弗洛伊德认为人的精神活动的能量来源于本能,本能是推动个体行为的内在动力。人类最基本的本能有两类:一类是生的本能,另一类是死亡本能或攻击本能,生的本能包括性欲本能与个体生存本能,其目的是保持种族的繁衍与个体的生存。弗洛伊德是泛性论者,在他的眼里,性欲有着广义的含意,是指人们一切追求快乐的欲望,性本能冲动是人一切心理活动的内在动力,当这种能量(弗洛伊德称之为力必多)积聚到一定程度就会造成机体的紧张,机体就要寻求途径释放能量。弗洛伊德将人的性心理发展划分为5个阶段:①口欲期;②肛门期;③性蕾欲期;④潜伏期;⑤生殖期。刚生下来的婴儿就懂得吸乳,乳头摩擦口唇粘膜引起快感,叫做口欲期性欲。1岁半以后学会自己大小便,粪块摩擦直肠肛门粘膜产生快感,叫做肛门期性欲。儿童到3岁以后懂得了两性的区别,开始对异性父母眷恋,对同性父母嫉恨,这一阶段叫性蕾欲期,其间充满复杂的矛盾和冲突,儿童会体验到俄底普斯(Oedipus)情结(或称为恋母情节)和厄勒克特拉(Electra)情结(或称为恋父情节),这种感情更具性的意义,不过还只是心理上的性爱而非生理上的性爱。只有经过潜伏期到达青春期性腺成熟才有成年的性欲。成年人成熟的性欲以生殖器性交为最高满是形式,以生育繁衍后代为目的,这就进入了生殖期。弗洛伊德认为成人人格的基本组成部分在前三个发展阶段已基本形成,所以儿童的早年环境、早期经历对其成年后的人格形成起着重要的作用,许多成人的变态心理、心理冲突都可追溯到早年期创伤性经历和压抑的情结。 弗洛伊德在后期对提出了死亡本能即桑纳托斯(thanatos),它是促使人类返回生命前非生命状态的力量。死亡是生命的终结,是生命的最后稳定状态,生命只有在这时才不再需要为满足生理欲望而斗争。只有在此时,生命不再有焦虑和抑郁,所以所有生命的最终目标是死亡。死亡本能派生出攻击、破坏、战争等一切毁灭行为。当它转向机体内部时,导致个体的自责,甚至自伤自杀,当它转向外部世界时,导致对他人的攻击、仇恨、谋杀等。 四、释梦理论 弗洛伊德是一个心理决定论者,他认为人类的心理活动有着严格的因果关系,没有一件事是偶然的,梦也不例外,绝不是偶然形成的联想,而是愿望的达成,在睡眠时,超我的检查松懈,潜意识中的欲望绕过抵抗,并以伪装的方式,乘机闯入意识而形成梦,可见梦是对清醒时被压抑到潜意识中的欲望的一种委婉表达。梦是通向潜意识的一条秘密通道。通过对梦的分析可以窥见人的内部心理,探究其潜意识中的欲望和冲突。通过释梦可以治疗神经症。 五、心理防御机制理论 弗洛伊德的女儿安娜·弗洛伊德在其父亲理论的基础上,提出了著名的“心理防御机制理论”。心理防御机制是自我的一种防卫功能,很多时候,超我与原我之间,原我与现实之间,经常会有矛盾和冲突,这时人就会感到痛苦和焦虑,这时自我可以在不知不觉之中,以某种方式,调整一个冲突双方的关系,使超我的监察可以接受,同时原我的欲望又可以得到某种形式的满足,从而缓和焦虑,消除痛苦,这就是自我的心理防御机制,它包括压抑、否认、投射,退化、隔离、抵消转化、合理化、补偿、升华、幽默、反向形成等各种形式。人类在正常和病态情况下都在不自觉地运用,运用得当,可减轻痛苦,帮助度过心理难关,防止精神崩溃,运用过度就会表现出焦虑抑郁等病态心理症状。 压 抑——当一个人的某种观念、情感或冲动不能被超我接受时,就被潜抑到无意识中去,以使个体不再因之而产生焦虑、痛苦,这是一种不自觉的主动遗忘和抑制。如很多人宁愿相信自己能中六合彩而不愿想像自己出街时遇车祸的危险,其实后一种的概率远比前者大,这是一种压抑机制的不自觉运用,因为当人意识到每次出街都要面临车祸的威胁时就会感到焦虑,人为了避免焦虑故意将其遗忘。 否 认——指有意或无意地拒绝承认那些不愉快的现实以保护自我的心理防御机制。如有的人听到亲人突然死亡的消息,短期内否认有此事以减免突如其来的精神打击。 投 射——指个体将自己不能容忍的冲动、欲望转移到他人的身上,以免除自责的痛苦,如一个人性张力过大,做梦时都梦见另一个人与异性在发生性行为,这是自我为了逃避超我的责难,又要满足自我的需要,将自己的欲望投射到别人的身上从而得到一种解脱的心理机制。 退 行——当人受到挫折无法应付时,即放弃已经学会的成熟态度和行为模式,使用以往较幼稚的方式来满足自己的欲望,这叫退行。如某些性变态病人就是如此,成年人遇到性的挫折无法满足时就用幼年性欲的方式来表达非常态的满足,例如在异性面前暴露自己的生殖器等。 隔 离——将一些不快的事实或情感分隔于意识之外,以免引起精神上的不愉快,这种机制叫隔离,如人们来月经很多人都说成“来例假”人死了叫“仙逝”“归天”,这样说起来可以避免尴尬或悲哀。 抵 消——以象征性的行为来抵消已往发生的痛苦事件,如强迫症病人固定的仪式动作常是用来抵消无意识中乱伦感情和其他痛苦体验。 转 化——指精神上的痛苦,焦虑转化为躯体症状表现出来,从而避开了心理焦虑和痛苦,如歇斯底里病人的内心焦虑或心理冲突往往以躯体化的症状表现出来,如瘫痪、失音、抽搐,晕厥、痉挛性斜颈等等,病者自己对此完全不知觉,转化的动机完全是潜意识的,是病者意识不能承认的。 补 偿——是指个体利用某种方法来弥补其生理或心理上的缺陷,从而掩盖自己的自卑感和不安全感,所谓“失之东隅,收之桑榆”就是这种作用。 合理化——是个体遭受挫折时用利于自己的理由来为自己辨解,将面临的窘境加以文饰,以隐满自己的真实动机,从而为自己进行解脱的一种心理防御机制,如狐狸吃不到葡萄就说葡萄是酸的。 升 华——指被压抑的不符合社会规范的原始冲动或欲望用符合社会要求的建设性方式表达出来的一种心理防御机制,如用跳舞,绘画,文学等形式来替代性本能冲动的发泄。 幽 默——是指以幽默的语言或行为来应付紧张的情境或表达潜意识的欲望。通过幽默来表达攻击性或性欲望,可以不必担心自我或超我的抵制,在人类的幽默中关于性爱,死亡、淘汰,攻击等话题是最受人欢迎的,它们包含着大量的受压抑的思想。 反向形式——自认为不符合社会道德规范的内心欲望或冲动会引起自我和超我的抵制,表现出来会被社会惩罚或引起内心焦虑,故朝相反的途径释放导致反向形成。如有些恐人症的病人内心是渴望接解异性的,但却偏偏表现出对异性恐惧。 主要著作《歇斯底里研究》(又译《癔病研究》,与 J.布洛伊尔合著,1895)《梦的解析》(1900) 《日常生活中的心理病理学》(1904) 《多拉的分析》(1905) 《玩笑及其与无意识的关系》(1905) 《性学三论》(1905) 《精神分析运动史》(1906) 《列奥纳多·达·芬奇和他对童年时代的一次回忆》(1910) 《图腾与禁忌》(1913) 《论无意识》(1915) 《超越唯乐原则》(1920) 《群体心理学与自我的分析》(1922) 《自我与本我》(1923) 《焦虑问题》(1926) 《幻想的未来》(1927) 《自我和防御机制》(1936) (安娜·弗洛伊德著) 《摩西与一神教》 (1939) 生平西格蒙德·弗洛伊德(Sigmund Freud)于1856年出生在弗赖贝格市,该市现在位于捷克境内摩拉维亚省,当时是奥地利帝国的一部分。他四岁时全家迁居到维也纳,他的一生几乎都是在那里度过的。弗洛伊德读书时就是一个出类拔萃的学生,1881年他在维也纳大学获得医学学位。在随后的十年中,他在一个精神病诊所行医,个人开业治疗神经病,同时致力于生理学的研究。他在巴黎与杰出的精神病专家让·夏尔科共事。他还曾与维也纳内科专家约瑟夫·布鲁尔共过事。弗洛伊德的心理学思想是逐渐发展起来的。直到1895年才出版了他的第一部论著《歇斯底里论文集》;他的第二部论著《梦的解析》于1900年问世,这是他最有创造性、最有意义的论著之一。虽然该书开始非常滞销,但是却大大地提高了他的声望,他的其它重要论著也相继问世。1908年弗洛伊德在美国做了一系列演讲,当时他已是一位知名人士了。1902年他在维也纳组织了一个心理学研究小组,艾尔弗雷德·阿德勒就是其中的最早成员之一,几年以后卡尔·容也加入了这个行列,两个人后来都成了名副其实的世界著名心理学家。 弗洛伊德结过婚,有六个孩子。他晚年患了颌癌,为了解除病根,他从1932年起先后做过三十多次手术。尽管如此,他仍然工作不息,继续写出了一些重要论著。1938年纳粹分子入侵奥地利,由于弗洛伊德是犹太人,因此他不顾八十二岁高龄逃往伦敦,1939年3月23日在那里因癌症不幸去世。 弗洛伊德对心理学做出了很大贡献,用简短的文字很难加以概括。他强调人的行为中的无意识思维过程极为重要。他证明了这样的过程如何影响梦的内容,如何造成常见的不幸,如口误,忘记人名,致伤的事故,甚至疾病。 弗洛伊德创造了用精神分析来治疗精神病的方法。他系统地论述了人的个性结构学说,还发展和普及了一些心理学学说,如有关焦虑、防御功能、阉割情绪、抑制和升华等,在此不必一一列及。他的著作极大地引起了人们对心理学的兴趣,对他的许多观点在过去和现在都存在着很大的争论,而且自从他提出之日起就引起了热烈的争论。 弗洛伊德最为世人所知也许是由于他提出了受抑制的性爱经常会引起精神病或神经病这一学说(实际上这个学说并不是由弗洛伊德创立的,虽然他的著作为普及这个学说做出了许多贡献)。他还指出,性爱和性欲始于早期儿童时期而不是成年时期。 由于对弗洛伊德的许多学说仍有很大争议,因此很难估计出他在历史上的地位。他有创立新学说的杰出才赋,是一位先驱者和带路人。但是弗洛伊德的学说与达尔文和巴斯德的不同,从未赢得过科学界的普遍承认,所以很难说出他的学说中有百分之几最终会被认为是正确的。 尽管对弗洛伊德的学说一直存在着争论,他仍不愧为是人类思想史上的一位极其伟大的人物。他的心理学观点使我们对人类思想的观念发生了彻底的革命,他提出的概念和术语已被普遍使用──例如,本我(Id),自我(Ego),超我(Super-Ego),恋母情绪(Oedipus complex)和死亡冲动(Death Drive或Death Instinct)。 精神分析法实际上是一种代价极高的治疗方法,因此往往无效。但是也有许多成功的事例应当归于这种方法,这是无容置疑。未来的心理学家很可能最终会断定受抑制的性爱所起的作用比许多弗洛伊德派学者所认为的要小,但是这种作用肯定比弗洛伊德以前的大多数心理学家所认为的要大。同样,大多数心理学家现在已经确信无意识思维过程对人的行为起着一种决定性的作用── 一种在弗洛伊德之前被大大低估了的作用。 弗洛伊德当然不是心理学的鼻祖。从长远的观点来看,人们也许会认为他作为心理学家所提出的学说并非十分正确;但是他显然是在现代心理学发展中最有影响、最重要的人物。 弗洛伊德的本色 在心理学的年鉴上,没有任何哪位人物会像西格蒙·弗洛伊德这样倍受吹捧而又惨遭诋毁,既被目为伟大的科学家、学派领袖,又被斥责为搞假科学的骗子。他的崇拜者和批评家都一致认为,他对心理学的影响,对心理治疗的影响,对西方人看待自己的方式的影响,比科学史上的任何人都要大得多;而在其他人看来,他们似乎是在谈论不同的人和不同的知识体系。 社会学家和弗洛伊德研究学者菲力普·里夫1959 年说,“这个人的伟大之处不容置疑,这使他的思想更加伟大”,而他的写作“也许是20 世纪汇成著作的、最重要的思想体系”。 可是,几年之后,一位著名的学者和人文学教授艾里克·海勒却在《时报》文艺副刊中说,弗洛伊德是我们这个时代吹捧太过的人物之一;诺贝尔桂冠的彼德·梅达沃爵士称心理分析理论为“本世纪最惊人的知识欺诈”。政治科学家保尔·娄森认为,弗洛伊德“毫无疑问是历史上最伟大的心理学家之一”,而且是“一位伟大的思想家”。神学家保尔·蒂利希认为他是“所有深层心理学家当中最有深度的一位”。可一位英国学者索顿却收集了一些证据,这些证据,按她自己的意见,是可以证明“(弗洛伊德的)重要的假说,即‘深层意识’不存在,他的理论毫无根据而且荒唐可笑”,说他是在可卡因的毒力影响下编制出这些理论的,说他是“一个虚伪而且没有信仰的预言家”。 弗洛伊德的崇拜者,包括他最近的传记作者,历史学者彼德·盖依在内,都把他看成是一个大无畏的人,是真理的勇敢卫士。恶意毁谤他的人却视他为精神病患者和野心勃勃的人,企图通过发表耸人听闻的理论哗众取宠。不过,出语不凡的一位学者杰弗里·梅森却宣称,弗洛伊德实际上还有重要的发现没有照直说出来,因为那会对他的职业生涯造成损害,这个发现即是,精神病是一个成人(通常是父亲)对孩子进行性虐待造成的后果。大部分心理学史学家都把一长串有影响的发现归功于弗洛伊德,最为值得注意的是原动无意识的发现。可是,科学史学家弗兰克·索罗维曾颇有见地地评论说,弗洛伊德的概念在很大程度上是对已经存在于神经学和生物学当中的一些思想的“创造性的转述”,而学者亨利·埃伦伯格也颇费心思地提出,弗洛伊德对原动无意识的发现,只不过是把他的前辈或者同时代人早已提出来的一些流传中的思想明确化了,并给它们一个清晰的外型而已。 弗洛伊德对自己的看法,他的大多数传记作者也是这样看的,既他自己是一位局外人——一位在反闪米特的维也纳被隔离开来的犹太人——勇敢无畏地与保守医学作斗争,希望他的发现能造福人道精神。贬诋他的人却说,他在夸大自己周围的反闪族氛围,企图让自己看起来像是一位勇敢战斗的英雄,而且,无论怎么说,他的许多思想皆来自他的朋友威尔汉姆·弗莱亚斯,可他却全部据为已有。 这么多正反不一的意见,我们该采用哪一说呢? 可是,再一看,我们对一个本身就是一串矛盾的人说些什么呢?他关于人性的理论异常激烈,他还是一位强硬的无神论者,除了他的早年以外,他在政治上是一位保守派。他在性欲问题上采取了极为自由的学术态度可在自己又是一位礼仪的模范和采取性节制态度的人。他宣称自己通过有名的自我精神分析解除了精神烦恼,可他一辈子都在遭受某类精神症状的痛苦,其中包括偏头疼,尿道及大肠问题,对电话几乎病态的讨厌,在极度紧张的个人压抑时经常有晕倒的倾向,还有对雪茄几乎病态的着迷。(他一天抽20 支,哪怕是上腭因此而得了癌之后还停不下来。)他不喜欢维也纳,从未参加到当地很随便的喝咖啡的人群里去,可又下不了决心离开这个地方去找另一个更合适的地方,直到1938 年纳粹占领了奥地利之后才搬到伦敦去。 有时候,他是个不顾一切的自我中心者,他把自己比作哥白尼和达尔文,而且还对一位称赞他的晚期作品的人说:“这是我最差的一本书,是一位老人写的书。真正的弗洛伊德是位了不起的人。”另外一些时候,他又像是极其谦逊,在他的晚年,在“一份自传性研究”中,他写道: 那么,回过头来,看看我这一辈子所做的些杂碎工作,我可以说,我做了许多开创性的工作,也提出了许多建议。将来,某些东西会从中诞生出来,不过,我自己还不能够说这东西是大是小。然而,我可以表达一个希望,即我打开了一条通道,沿着这个通道,我们的知识会有长足的进步。 他生活在一个充满爱心的大家庭里,周围有很多忠实的信徒,可是,他与自己最亲密的朋友和追随者进行了好多年的争斗。他在古稀之年还悲哀地写道:许多人的爱我不能够指望。我并没有逼他们高兴,没有为他们提供舒适的生活,也没有给他们以熏陶。这些也不是我的本意所在,我只想去探索,解开一些谜团,揭开一部分真理。 在照片中,弗洛伊德总是一脸严肃,表情沉重——穿戴无可挑剔,发式整齐,肃穆而不苟言笑——然而,他自己的作品,还有了解他的那些人写的回忆文章里都证明,他是一个极为机智的人,他喜欢讲一些好笑的故事,把一种心理学观点带进故事里。这里有一个例子,是从他对幽默的研究《玩笑与无意识的关系》中选出来的: 如果(一位医生)问一个年轻病人,说他是否与手淫有关系,答案一定是:“O,na,nie!(德语:‘呵,不,从没有”——可是,在德语中,onanie 的意思就是“手淫。”) 还有一个长一点的幽默故事,弗洛伊德很喜欢讲,讲得也不错: 沙申(犹太媒人)站在他推荐的姑娘一边,替她平息那年轻男子的不满。“我不在乎岳母如何,”后者说,“她是个不逗人喜欢的蠢人。” ——“可是,不管怎么说,你并不是要去娶岳母,你想要的是她女儿。” ——“是啊,可她也不太年轻了,而且她也并非严格意义上的美人。” ——“没有关系。如果她既不年轻,也不美,那她正好就是对您忠实的那一类。” ——“而且她也没有多少钱。” ——“谁在谈钱的话?那你是不是要跟钱结婚?你要娶的毕竟是个老婆啊。” ——“可她的腰也驼了。” ——“哎呀,你到底想要什么?她连一点缺点都不能有吗?” 很明显,弗洛伊德的本色最起码来说也算不上简单。可是,让我们来看看我们可以看到什么吧。 |
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